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Preface 
 
From the outside, my path to producing this dissertation might look a little unorthodox. I 
went from getting a B.A. and Master’s in Russian Literature to doing a student-initiated dual-
Ph.D. in Comparative Literature and History, with a particular focus on media studies and 
Mexican political history in the twentieth century. When I think about it, though, it was a pretty 
logical progression.  
I used my first summer as a doctoral student to conduct research in Mexico City. My 
original conception of the dissertation I hoped to write entailed locating points of literary 
influence and intellectual exchange between twentieth-century figures and groups in the United 
States, Mexico, and Russia. So, naturally, I ended up spending most of that first summer buried 
in a dusty, unmarked residence on an unassuming street in Coyoacán, which housed an extensive 
archive of the Mexican Communist Party (the Centro de Estudios del Movimiento Obrero y 
Socialista, CEMOS). Day after day I rifled through seemingly endless boxes of inter-party 
memos, student broadsides, and old copies of the official party newspaper, El machete. The 
newspapers themselves were big—astoundingly big—and beautiful and fascinating. They 
contained plenty of the “connections” I was looking for: guest columns by American authors, 
translations of Soviet poetry, artwork by prominent artists like David Alfaro Siqueiros and José 
Clemente Orozco, including woodblock prints and photomontages depicting radical figures and 
thinkers from Marx to Maxim Gorky. I didn’t have the necessary historical background to fully 
appreciate the contexts of the political developments and ideological and artistic polemics I was 
seeing unfold on the pages of each issue of El machete, which I now realize may have been 
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fortuitous, because it prompted me to wonder how much I could learn about that unfolding by—
to put it in crude, media-studies-101 terms—studying the media themselves as much as their 
“content.”  
Looking back, I’d describe this as a fundamentally literary experience for me. The things 
I was touching with my hands, reading with my eyes, and absorbing into my brain were making 
me more than what I had been before, prompting me to think different things, sparking an eight-
year process in which I would visit places, meet people, and engage in political struggles I hadn’t 
had the capacity to imagine before. Just like when I would read my favorite Russian novels as a 
young undergraduate, I sensed that this encounter was rearticulating me into something else. And 
it revealed, in the process, that the person I am at any given point is contingent upon these kinds 
of relations and encounters, and that they occur on many levels, making me many subjects at 
once. It revealed that I, too, am a process, and that the being I call myself was not simply born 
into the world fully formed, self-contained, and in possession of all the traits that have come to 
define the human being behind the name on this dissertation. Rather, in a gradual but constant 
unfolding, or becoming, who I have come to be has always been shaped by the world I inhabit, 
by my evolving relations to the people I love and to the people who encounter me, by the 
environment of the places I live, by the information I have absorbed from sources outside of my 
own head (books, movies, weather cycles, “common sense”), by the tools I use to functionally 
participate in social life (language, clothing, phones, cars, social cues)—and by the possibilities 
for thinking, acting, and imagining that might not exist for me without them. Inasmuch as I have 
hoped to “leave a mark” on the world, to shape in some way (hopefully for the better) the 
becoming of others, I am marked in innumerable ways by the world I’m a part of; the being that I 
am is an open circuit between the two.  
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Moreover, as I read more about the political struggles of leftists in Mexico over the past 
century, I began to see Mexico City differently, noting all that had seemingly changed—and all 
that hadn’t. At the same time that I was beginning to critically interrogate the openness and 
impressionability of selves like mine, to think about the contingent encounters and processes 
through which being is mediated and history is shaped, I also came to wonder what forces were 
working in the opposite direction, what structures existed in the world around me (from the 
architecture of buildings and cities to cultural traditions, laws, and habits) that mediated 
continuity and sameness more than they facilitated change and contingency. Why didn’t the 
Mexico I was living and researching in look like the Mexico communists in the 1920s dreamed 
of and tried to create? How much did the Mexico they lived in change during their lifetimes as a 
result of their political efforts? How were they able to intervene in the arrangement of the world 
that mediated their own being and becomings? How might the newspapers and other media I was 
studying in the archives have once played a part in a larger effort to rearrange that arrangement? 
And if those efforts ultimately failed, why?  
What I wanted to do with my project, I realized, was historicize these processes of 
mediated becoming, and to see if I thought about politics differently if I thought about it in these 
terms. This, too, was a process. After that first summer in Mexico City, I began developing a 
dissertation project that would analyze the political media used by these and other leftist factions 
in Mexico to communicate, popularize, and actuate their radical visions for a more just and 
equitable world. It soon developed, however, into an effort to articulate that dynamism of 
historical landscapes in which the entities and relations signified by “politics,” “media,” and “the 
left” are engaged in uneven processes of making and unmaking each other, as opposed to ever 
being fully defined as such by some stagnant qualities or pure essence that exist out of time and 
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medial context. Using interdisciplinary methods and modes of inquiry became a necessity to 
better analyze the ways that historical epochs, subjects, and movements emerge within such 
dynamically changing media-worlds, to understand the ways certain arrangements of life, 
society, and selfhood take root and become hegemonic, limiting the possibilities that can result 
from that dynamism, and to think through the varied social, material, and existential dimensions 
these process play out in and leave their mark on. (I say this as a partial explanation for my 
decision to initiate a dual-degree in History and Comparative Literature).  
Putting these questions into practice, giving them concrete and intelligible form, and 
letting my research speak through a method of examining history that articulates the dynamism 
of becoming and the politics of media—that’s what I hoped to achieve with this dissertation. 
However, I have my doubts that I have been successful. This is not the dissertation I hoped to 
end up with; then again, having completed the dissertation while working full-time, locked inside 
during a global pandemic, thousands of miles away from family, I concede that these were not 
the circumstances I expected to be writing under. But the dissertation, like me, is a process. 
Contained in the three following chapters are distinct traces of every stage of thinking and 
rethinking that I have passed through during my eight years as a graduate student: concepts from 
the same thinkers that I employ differently now than I did three years ago when I was drafting 
parts of what became Chapters One and Two; sources I draw from more—and analyses that are 
less clunky—in the sections of Chapters Two and Three that were written more recently; hopes 
expressed in my theoretical analyses in Chapter One that Chapters Two and Three didn’t fulfill; 
etc. As opposed to a complete, self-contained body of work cohesively organized around a 
central argument and consistent approach, this dissertation is a palimpsest stamped with 
evolution after evolution in my thinking about the being and becoming of people, media, and 
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leftist politics in early twentieth-century Mexico. If certain sections that I needed to write in 
order to get to the writing of more sophisticated sections prove to be less useful or interesting, I 
hope they at least demonstrate their necessity in the evolution of my thinking over the past eight 
years—an evolution that was helpfully mediated by the guidance and support of my committee 
and my committee Chair.  
Still, I believe there are glimmers of the kind of historical analysis that I advocate for in 
the chapters that follow. And maybe that is enough, for now. Because, ultimately, what I present 
here is an uneven, tentative attempt to see history, people, movements, and ideas in motion, and 
to trace that movement through the media and medial relations that connect beings to one 
another and to the world they’re a part of—through the media and medial relations that facilitate 
the becoming of that which is never fully contained within itself, which is to say: everything. 
What I present here, that is, is an examination of  two political movements on either side of the 
Mexican revolution, embodied in the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) and the Partido 
Comunista Mexicano (PCM), as they developed in conversation with medial environments that 
were changing, that changed them, and that they, in turn, tried to change themselves. In so doing, 
I attempt to reframe (or expand) analyses of their politics in terms of their entanglements in and 
navigation of these medial environments, their efforts to harness components within those 
environments for their own ends, and their strategies for reorienting the arrangement of said 
environments to better fit their visions of the world people deserved to have and the lives they 
deserved to live. Moreover, as I argue in Chapter One, this mode of historical analysis provides a 
useful frame for interpreting what qualifies such political efforts as “left”—and for measuring 
their effectiveness (or their failures). This mode of historical analysis, that is, posits that politics 
consists of the struggle to intervene in and reorient the hegemonic medial arrangements that 
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mediate being and becoming, and that leftist politics as such consists in the struggle to reorient 
said arrangements in ways that will enable human beings to live together in unalienated 
communion with the world they are a part of (and that is, always, a part of them). This is the 
story I try to tell in the ensuing chapters, and this is the way I try to tell it; it is a story of Mexican 
radicals who were shaped by the media-worlds they were entangled in, and who navigated those 
entanglements at the same time that they developed and engaged in collective political projects 
that aimed to rearrange them in ways that would allow people to finally live in a world that 
didn’t hurt.  
Thus, in Chapter One, as mentioned above, I establish the theoretical foundations and 
justifications for analyzing media, history, people, and (leftist) politics this way—and I do so by 
investigating the possibilities for merging the metaphysical deconstruction of Reiner Schürmann 
and the anthropotechnical “spherology” of Peter Sloterdijk. While the bulk of this chapter is very 
much in the theoretical “weeds,” it ultimately embodies a process of thought—and engagement 
with many different thinkers—in which I try to answer three central questions: (1) Under what 
circumstances could we come to understand anarchism to be the eventual horizon of all politics 
that could be described as “left”? (2) In comparing the political and intellectual principles of 
classical anarchism with Reiner Schürmann’s concept of an-archē, how might such a comparison 
enable us to conceptualize the medial arrangements by which hegemony is actualized and to 
interpret politics as the struggle to intervene in and reshape said arrangements—and, in so doing, 
to establish the conditions for living an unalienated life? (3) How can Sloterdijk’s spherology, 
combined with an elemental understanding of media as the technics of life, provide a conceptual 
framework for analyzing (leftist) politics in these terms? In the following chapters, I aim to 
synthesize these thorny theoretical questions and express them concretely by interrogating the 
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politics of the PLM and the PCM as, elementally, media politics. While I do analyze the primary 
medium through which each movement represented itself—Regeneración, the PLM’s official 
newspaper, and El machete, which would become the official organ of the PCM—I also zoom 
out to show how each medium participated in broader, diffuse, and interconnected medial-
political efforts to intervene in the hegemonic medial arrangements of their time. In Chapter 
Two, I primarily examine the diffuse and interconnecting dimensions of a concerted media 
politics that made up the movement of magonismo, from networks of Liberal Clubs throughout 
Mexico to Regeneración itself and the clandestine, transnational medial infrastructure through 
which it was produced, disseminated, and engaged with. In Chapter Three, however, while 
examining the media politics of the PCM party apparatus (such that it was) and its newspaper, El 
machete, I devote more attention to surveying the tangled, hegemonic medial landscape in which 
the early PCM hoped (but struggled greatly) to intervene in the 1920s.  
If nothing else, I hope that what I have produced here, incomplete as it is, will at least 
help to clear a space for thinking differently; for thinking about history as the history of 
becoming; for thinking about politics as the struggle to be more human—and to create a world 
that mediates the conditions for unalienated living; and for thinking about media as the 
connective (im)material tissue of being, as that which connects us to each other and to our world, 
as the lively forces of in-between-ness whose operations remind us that nothing contains its 
essence entirely within itself—to be is to be in conversation with the world, and media are the 
facilitators of that conversation.   
That is to say, I hope the approach I take here will provide a space for thinking differently 
about the worlds we inhabit, how they (and we) came to be what they are, and how we can 
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change them so that we can live the unalienated lives we deserve as the humans we’re capable of 
being.     
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Abstract 
 
All history is media history, and all politics are media politics. This dissertation provides 
an analytical frame for seeing and studying the people, ideas, political movements, and social 
arrangements that populate history as both solid forms and fluid processes; that is, as beings in 
the world whose shape, influence, and “essence” are never fully nor statically defined by some 
individual, isolable, ahistorical qualities but, rather, come to be (and be defined as) what they are 
in an open, interpenetrating, and constantly unfolding conversation with the world they’re a part 
of. Media, I argue, are the facilitators of that conversation—the connective (im)material tissue 
that entangles beings with one another and with the world in which they live, become, and 
function. Thus, in the chapters that follow, I examine two political movements on either side of 
the Mexican revolution (1910-1920), embodied in the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) and the 
Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM), as they developed in conversation with medial 
environments that were changing, that changed them, and that they, in turn, tried to change 
themselves. In so doing, I attempt to reframe analyses of their politics in terms of their 
entanglements in and navigation of these medial environments, their efforts to harness 
components within those environments for their own ends, and their strategies for reorienting the 
arrangement of said environments to better fit their visions of the world people deserved to have 
and the lives they deserved to live within it. 
 In Chapter One, I establish the theoretical foundations and justifications for analyzing 
media, history, people, and (leftist) politics this way. Ultimately, this chapter aims to answer 
three central questions: (1) Under what circumstances could we come to understand anarchism as 
 xvi 
the eventual horizon of all politics that could be described as “left”? (2) In comparing the 
political and intellectual principles of classical anarchism with Reiner Schürmann’s concept of 
an-archē, how might such a comparison enable us to conceptualize the medial arrangements by 
which hegemony is actualized and to interpret politics as the struggle to intervene in and reshape 
said arrangements? (3) How can Sloterdijk’s spherology, combined with an elemental 
understanding of media as the technics of life itself, provide a framework for analyzing (leftist) 
politics in these terms? In the following chapters, I synthesize these thorny theoretical questions 
and express them concretely by interrogating the media politics of the PLM and the PCM. While 
I do analyze the primary medium through which each movement represented itself—
Regeneración, the PLM’s official newspaper, and El machete, which would become the official 
organ of the PCM—I zoom out to show how each medium participated in broader, diffuse, and 
interconnected medial-political efforts to intervene in the hegemonic medial arrangements of 
their time. In Chapter Two, I primarily examine the diffuse and interconnecting dimensions of a 
concerted media politics that made up the movement of magonismo, from networks of Liberal 
Clubs throughout Mexico to Regeneración itself and the clandestine, transnational medial 
infrastructure through which it was produced, disseminated, and engaged with. In Chapter Three, 
however, while examining the media politics of the PCM party apparatus (such that it was) and 
its newspaper, El machete, I devote more attention to surveying the tangled, hegemonic medial 
landscape in which the early PCM hoped (but struggled greatly) to intervene in the 1920s. 
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Chapter I. Being Media 
 
In this chapter, I establish the theoretical foundations and justifications for the historical 
analysis I conduct in Chapters Two and Three, in which I tell the story of the PLM, the PCM, 
and the political media they crafted, harnessed, and deployed in order to communicate, 
popularize, and actuate their radical visions for a more just and equitable world. However, as I 
argue throughout this dissertation, conceptualizing, let alone capturing, the dynamic historical 
landscape in which these media were created, disseminated, and engaged with requires a 
historical analysis of the ways such media, the people engaging with them, and the world they 
inhabited were entangled in constant, uneven processes of shaping and being shaped by one 
another. It requires a mode of historical analysis that eschews what Peter Sloterdijk calls the 
“substance fetishism” that conditions us to see ourselves and all beings as discrete, self-contained 
entities defined by some particular, isolable, and static qualities or essence, and not as beings in 
process that are defined just as much by our entangled medial relations to one another and to the 
world we’re a part of. Thus, in this chapter, I draw upon key concepts, thinkers, and traditions in 
media and political theory (Peter Sloterdijk, Reiner Schürmann, Bernard Stiegler, Mark B.N. 
Hansen, etc.) in order to deconstruct the premises of this substance fetishism, to reframe our 
understanding of what media are and what they do, and to argue for the necessity of historical 
analyses that see history as the history of becoming in and through media. This conceptual 
reframing, moreover, leads us to reexamine politics as the collective struggle to intervene in and 
reshape the hegemonic social arrangements that mediate being and becoming. In turn, by 
interrogating the theoretical and practical convergences of classical anarchism and Reiner 
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Schürmann’s concept of an-archē, I argue that the inevitable condition for a decidedly leftist 
politics is the ultimate reorientation of hegemonic medial arrangements in ways that enable 
human beings to live in unalienated communion with one another and the world they’re a part of.  
 
************************** 
 
At the dawn of the red century, the flag of left internationalism was undeniably 
black. Before the landscape of the left imagination would come to be dominated by figures 
of the Bolshevik revolution, Red Vienna, the Spartacist uprising, and the Third 
International, the spores of anarchism were germinating from Russia and Spain to Argentina 
and the Philippines. “Following the collapse of the First International, and Marx’s death in 
1883,” as Benedict Anderson writes, “anarchism, in its characteristically variegated forms, 
was the dominant element in the self-consciously internationalist radical Left” (Under Three 
Flags, 2). 
Numerous, intersecting factors converging by the turn of the twentieth century would 
ripen the conditions for anarchism’s attractiveness to increasingly international-minded radicals. 
While anarchism would continue to face an uphill battle against the imposing theoretical legacy 
of Marx and Engels, it had still produced its own scientific figurehead in Peter Kropotkin along 
with charismatic leaders like Mikhail Bakunin and Errico Malatesta, who appealed to the passion 
and desire for direct action among those for whom the slow-moving, institutionalized forms of 
socialist parties and labor unions seemed unfulfilling or misguided. As a cohesive movement, 
anarchism paled in comparison to Second International socialism, but as a transnationally 
appealing intellectual and spiritual force, it punched far above its weight. This was due in large 
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part to the accelerated opening of the world to new communications media and transportation 
networks that enabled people, goods, news, and ideas to circulate around the globe on an 
unprecedented scale. Steamships and railroads traversed waterways and penetrated the vast 
interiors of national territories. In the process, as Richard White describes, these new 
technologies of movement, transportation, and connection fundamentally reoriented humans’ 
spatiotemporal relations to the world, “making the quotidian experience of space one of rapid 
movement” and politicizing time itself by rewiring it to the tempo of modern machinery (141). In 
fact, the very experience of global movement in a modernizing world—the feeling of its pace 
and reach, the connections it fostered to new people and places—would help provide the 
conditions for fomenting the kind of internationalist attitude and consciousness embraced by 
anarchism at a time when orthodox Marxism was still more physically and epistemologically 
anchored to the sphere of Northern Europe. Anarchism “rode the huge waves of migration out 
of Europe that characterized the last 40 years before World War I: Italians, Spaniards, 
Portuguese, Poles, Jews and so on poured into the New World, round the Mediterranean, and 
into the empires being created by the Europeans in Asia and Africa” (B. Anderson, “Preface,” 
xv).  
At the same time, a communications revolution was electrifying the New and Old worlds, 
forging new medial connections—and accelerating old ones—across time, space, and planes of 
imagination. The expansion of electrical and telegraph lines across countries and ocean floors, 
the establishment of the Universal Postal Union, the gradual increase of working-class literacy 
rates, the cultural absorption and large-scale utilization of rotary presses and Linotype 
machines—these and other developments helped bring forth increasingly “globalized” capacities 
for communicating, thinking, and being. Most significantly, these medial connections and 
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capacities didn’t just exist in the privileged realms of society elites, but they were extending to 
the masses as well: “International telegraphic communication had enabled elites to stay abreast 
of global developments in the last third of the nineteenth century, but now the communications 
revolution had filtered down to the working class. Labor and radical movements in much of the 
world had established their own newspapers and were publishing their own books and 
pamphlets. The democratization of access to knowledge facilitated transnational collective 
mobilization” (McGirr, 1101). 
Moreover, when it came to fostering the spirit of internationalism, anarchism scratched 
many itches socialism simply did not. While both ideologies promoted visions of worker 
solidarity that, to varying degrees, aimed to transcend national allegiances, anarchism proved to 
be more internationalist in both theory and practice at a historical juncture when inter-party 
rivalries and domestic concerns were driving socialist strongholds to entrench themselves in 
regressive and chauvinistic approaches to “the national question”—approaches that would 
highlight the Second International’s greatest failings at the dawn of World War I.1 This 
internationalism was as much a natural derivative of anarchist thought as it was an outgrowth of 
the anarchist experience of transnational movement and the cultivation of solidarity in the global 
elsewhere. Along with the expanding flows of global migration, anarchism’s expulsion from the 
dominant sphere of institutionalized socialism in Europe left it to strike out on often 
unpredictable journeys to the places where its travelers and texts and spirit ventured, like viral 
nomads infiltrating local immune systems, coupling with homegrown political cultures, and 
 
1 See: George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (1970); George Haupt, Socialism and the 
Great War: The Collapse of the Second International (1972); Roger Fletcher, Revisionism and 
Empire: Socialist Imperialism in Germany, 1897-1914 (1984); S.F. Kissin, War and the 
Marxists: Socialist Theory and Practice in Capitalist Wars, 1848-1918 (1990). 
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becoming something new. “This internationalism certainly had its theoretical side,” Anderson 
notes, “but more important, it was a matter of experience and struggle in non-European contexts 
and terrains. Necessarily these first generation activists found themselves often as ‘foreigners’, 
and as such bringing the outside international world with them. If and when they returned to 
Europe, as many did, especially Italians, they brought that extra-Europe experience back home. 
The main thing was that they did not only work, but they constantly crossed state borders” 
(“Preface,” xv). 
Epistemologically, that is, anarchism proved to be far more open to the forgotten parts of 
socialism. While its international spirit was fundamentally tied to a vision of collective human 
liberation, above all else, anarchism was steeped in a libertarian romance for the education, 
liberation, and agency of the individual. As Max Stirner wrote, 
 
If it is the drive of our time, after freedom of thought is won, to pursue it to that 
perfection through which it changes to freedom of the will in order to realize the 
latter as the principle of a new era, then the final goal of education can no longer 
be knowledge, but the will born out of knowledge, and the spoken expression of 
that for which it has to strive is: the personal or free man. Truth itself consists in 
nothing other than man’s revelation of himself, and thereto belongs the discovery 
of himself, the liberation from all that is alien, the uttermost abstraction or 
release from all authority, the re-won naturalness (The False Principle) 
(emphases added).  
 
In a way that seemingly prefigures the young Marx’s theory of human beings’ alienation from 
their species-being (developed in letters to Engels two years after the publication of Stirner’s The 
False Principle of Our Education), Stirner powerfully articulates both the conditions of man’s 
alienated existence—materialized in the authority-empowering, hierarchical arrangements of 
society and self—and the indistinguishable human will to get free, to “re-win” its “naturalness,” 
and to live a life unalienated from itself. Both thinkers, and the political traditions they speak 
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from, are simultaneously expressing what I’ll argue are a shared metaphysical assumption—that 
who we are and the worlds we inhabit are always vulnerable to, and always shaping and 
reshaping each other—and a common end—being able to connect to and live in a world that is 
arranged in such a way that people don’t have to struggle to be human in it. Where they differed 
was on how to get there and what “there” would ultimately look like. For Stirner, the path to 
living in a world that would clear space for unalienated being runs through the individual, who, 
once given a taste of “the will born out of knowledge,” will be unable to suppress it and, in 
demanding more, will awaken that will in others. Marx would develop what, in form, was a 
similar premise: that the proletariat, once given a taste of class consciousness, will embody a 
collective and indistinguishable will to restructure the material arrangement of the world that 
suppresses its humanity (i.e., the political-economic arrangement that mediates its own 
systematized dehumanization).  
Anarchism’s primary celebration of individual freedom and will often translated into a 
more bohemian openness to eclectic intellectual canons. Thus, anarchism integrated “bourgeois” 
artists and thinkers into its cultural ecosystem in a way that Marxism was more resistant to. 
Perhaps most significantly, anarchism’s faith in self-determination put it ahead of the radical 
curve in its hostility to imperialism in all its forms and in its attentiveness to struggles in 
subaltern parts of the world by those whose humanity was suppressed (and whose 
dehumanization, it was acknowledged, was constitutive of the “civilization” of “superior” 
peoples).2 As Peter Kropotkin presciently wrote, “Since all our middle-class civilization is based 
 
2 See: Arif Dirlik, “Anarchism and the Question of Place: Thoughts from the Chinese 
Experience” (2010); Edilene Toledo and Luigi Biondi, “Constructing Syndicalism and 
Anarchism Globally: The Transnational Making of the Syndicalist Movement in Sao Paulo, 
Brazil, 1895-1935” (2010); Maia Ramnath, Decolonizing Anarchism: An Antiauthoritarian 
History of India’s Liberation Struggle (2011).  
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on the exploitation of inferior races and countries with less advanced industrial systems, the 
revolution will confer a boon at the very outset, by menacing that ‘civilization,’ and allowing the 
so-called inferior races to free themselves” (“Conquest of Bread,” 72). In a similar vein, 
anarchism proved more attentive to cultivating connections with the social classes that Marxism 
ignored; namely, the peasantry and “that eternal ‘meat’ (on which governments thrive), that great 
rabble of the people (underdogs, ‘dregs of society’) ordinarily designated by Marx and Engels in 
the picturesque and contemptuous phrase Lumpenproletariat […] the ‘riffraff,’ that ‘rabble’ 
almost unpolluted by bourgeois civilization, which carries in its inner being and in its aspirations 
[…] all the seeds of socialism of the future, and which alone is powerful enough today to 
inaugurate and bring to triumph the Social Revolution” (Bakunin, “On the International”). 
Orthodox Marxism held no great stock in the unorganized and purportedly “unpolitical” sectors 
of society, like the peasantry—“incapable of  enforcing  their  class  interests  in  their  own  
name” (Marx, “Eighteenth Brumaire,” 187)—and the Lumpenproletariat—that “whole 
indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French term la bohème” 
(Marx, “Eighteenth Brumaire,” 149). Such disregard stemmed from the firm belief that the 
historical progress of capitalist accumulation would eventually smooth out uneven social 
arrangements, including those of less developed countries, inevitably driving all laborers and 
“unpolitical” elements into the historical meatgrinder of industrial centers, absorbing them into 
the proletarian class, and amplifying the divide between workers and the upper class until it 
reached a breaking point. And yet, as Geoff Eley writes, “As the twentieth century confirmed, 
this confidence in a uniform capitalist model was misplaced—the European peasantry itself took 
a century to disappear; class polarization didn’t occur; and industrial workers became a 
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diminishing rather than an expanding part of society. Yet whatever the truth of the predictions, 
abandoning the peasantry to one’s opponents was still a mistake” (95). 
Still, in spite of (or, rather, because of) their differences, it is impossible to fully 
comprehend either anarchism or socialism at the turn of the century without considering both 
together: “anarchism cannot be thought of without Marxism and vice versa” (Vodovnik, 106). 
Despite their heated public rivalries, Marx absorbed concepts from Proudhon, Bakunin absorbed 
from Marx, and so on. Both political cultures were rooted in the same soil, both shared distinct 
principles: “an ethics of cooperative sociality, ideals of human improvement, militant secularism, 
basic collectivism—and for a while the two remained porous, especially locally” (Eley, 95). 
Nevertheless, the points of contention between them proved to be severe and indissoluble. Above 
all, anarchists deviated sharply from socialists on questions regarding the means of revolutionary 
struggle, especially with respect to the role of the state in paving the historical path to 
communism, which they rejected, along with any form of centralized government, which would, 
by necessity, embody the ontological violence of hierarchical authority. “The State is authority, it 
is force,” Bakunin writes, “it is the ostentatious display of and infatuation with power. It does not 
seek to ingratiate itself, to win over, to convert […] For by its very nature it cannot persuade but 
must impose and exert force. However hard it may try to disguise this nature, it will remain the 
legal violator of man’s will and the permanent denial of his liberty” (“Morality of the State,” 
145). Such violence, anarchists maintained, was also an implied fact of the bureaucratic and 
coercive structure of unions and official parties, which, along with electoral politics in general, 
they rejected in favor of direct action and “the dialectic of conspiratorial organization and 
popular spontaneity” (Eley, 96). Against the Second International’s scientific approach to 
gradual parliamentary and labor mobilization, anarchists harkened back to the conspiratorial 
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Blanquist ideal of revolution by barricades, bombs, and direct acts of subverting the hegemonic 
political order. 
These irreparable positions bore themselves out most (in)famously in the heated rivalry 
between Marx and Bakunin, which culminated in the expulsion of the latter from the First 
International during the Hague Congress in 1872. Bakunin was officially expelled after hotly 
objecting to the consensus vote in favor of Marx’s proposal that the true path to socialist 
revolution required the proletariat successfully infiltrating and taking control of the state; 
however, plans to get rid of the anarchist rabble-rouser and his comrades were in motion well 
before the Congress took place (Thomas, 327). “This is what personal vanity, the lust for power, 
and above all, political ambition can lead to,” Bakunin wrote spitefully later that year (“On the 
International”). Nevertheless, Bakunin was confident that his expulsion actually vindicated the 
position that he felt got him expelled in the first place: “Marx, in spite of all his mis-deeds, has 
unconsciously rendered a great service to the International by demonstrating in the most 
dramatic and evident manner that if anything can kill the International, it is the introduction of 
politics into its program” (“On the International”). For Bakunin and his fellow anarchists, the 
First International purge proved, in the most transparent way possible, the socialist authoritarian 
impulse Bakunin had decried most fervently in his prior objections to Marx. Bakunin, in this 
case, proved to be quite prescient. As Daniel Guérin writes,  
 
Bakunin attributed dangerous authoritarian designs to Marx, a thirst to dominate 
the working-class movement, whose features he exaggerated somewhat and 
shared himself. But by doing so, the Russian anarchist showed himself to be a 
prophet. With wonderful acumen, he predicted that Marx’s dictatorial propensities 
would spread out among his successors at some future and remote date, into what 
Bakunin called a red bureaucracy. He foresaw the kind of tyranny which the 
leaders of the Third International would exercise over the world labour movement 
(117).  
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Given the premium anarchism placed on the liberty of the individual as self-determining agent, 
there was something inherently fishy about socialism’s preference for organized intellectual and 
political bodies that, as Bakunin contended, naturally veered towards hierarchical power 
arrangements and coercive means of control and enforcement. As many would claim in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, Bakunin foresaw the imposing and repressive state bureaucracies 
that would come to define “actually-existing” state socialism.  
It has been a topic of interest for historians to determine whether or not this split was—
and always would be—the inevitable result of a conflict between two insoluble modes of anti-
capitalist thought or if, perhaps, things might have gone a different way if it weren’t for the 
heated personal conflict between two proud, anti-capitalist thinkers (Rocker, “Marx and 
Anarchism”). Regardless, the great rift between Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin historically 
exposed the irreparable differences between socialism and anarchism as much as it obscured the 
ineradicable ties between the two. “There is no difference between the ultimate objects of 
marxists and anarchists,” the great political historian Eric Hobsbawm writes; each ultimately 
strive for “a libertarian communism in which exploitation, classes and the state will have ceased 
to exist” (57). There are, of course, crucial strains of anarchist and proto-anarchist culture that 
take different positions in regards to the achievement and shape of the communist utopia: from 
visions of decentralized societies based on cooperative and communal integration of industry and 
agriculture in which workers would either be remunerated for labor time and retain some degree 
of private property (mutualism) or would participate in a system of communal work and 
ownership (anarcho-communism), to idealized arrangements that operated through the federation 
of producer-controlled industrial units (anarcho-syndicalism), and so on (Woodcock, 19-20). In 
this sense, as a historical movement and a theoretical ecosystem, anarchism is irreducibly 
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heterogeneous. As Peter Marshall writes, anarchism “does not offer a fixed body of doctrine […] 
It is a complex and subtle philosophy, embracing many different currents of thought and 
strategy” (3). One could argue that this heterogeneity is actually a built-in feature of anarchist 
belief itself, which, as Proudhon described to Marx, professes “an almost absolute […] anti-
dogmatism” (“Proudhon to Marx”). To situate anarchism within a single, coherent philosophical 
doctrine, to understand it primarily as the guided historical application of intellectually hashed-
out and fire-tempered theoretical principles, to give primacy to the textual authority of said 
principles over the practical working-out of lived experience, would contradict the very spirit of 
anarchism. 
Nevertheless, if we saw all the way down to the bone, we find that the spirit of 
anarchism, in its varied historical and theoretical iterations, commonly upholds: (1) a distinct 
view of human nature as something that inherently bends towards the will for freedom and 
cooperation; (2) a radical opposition to hierarchical and authority-empowering arrangements of 
life, self, society, and world; (3) the dream of a society-to-be in which the arrangement of life 
and society clears space for the expression of natural, authentic, and unalienated human being, an 
arrangement that is only possibilized by securing the mutual, mutually affirming, and 
simultaneous realization of full equality and liberty (Étienne Balibar, to signify this necessary 
mutuality, insists on the term “equaliberty”). As a state of being, anarchy actuates more than a 
social vision for a world that has inevitably rid itself of the existing artificial systems of power 
and authority that hold humans prisoner; anarchy is the expression of the coming-to-be of 
humanity itself, a humanity that has been unable to know itself insofar as its being is 
systematically stifled by such artificialities. It is, in Stirner’s terms, “the liberation from all that is 
alien, the uttermost abstraction or release from all authority” in the struggle to “re-win” the 
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“naturalness” of human being. Understanding this allows us to reposition anarchism’s relation to 
Marxism.  
Especially in his earlier writings, Marx fleshes out the alienation of man’s species-being 
(Gattungswesen) by exploring the degree to which it is subsumed under his relation to the 
process of production in a class society. This relation imposes on man and his labor the role of 
being a means to an end that is determined by an external force, thus stealing away the human 
capacity and natural drive to produce as an end in itself in a society where “Life itself appears 
only as a means of life” (“Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,” 76). Another way of saying 
this (which this dissertation hopes to justify), is that: by having our naturally immediate and 
symbiotic relations to the world rewired and mediated by external (and fundamentally 
hierarchical) forces, the human being itself becomes a dehumanized, biopolitical medium for 
materializing the arrangement of a political economy that alienates us from ourselves, from 
others, and from the world we’re a part of. Thus, for Marx, “The emancipation of the workers 
contains universal human emancipation—and it contains this, because the whole of human 
servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and every relation of servitude 
is but a modification and consequence of this relation” (“Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts,” 80). Anarchism, it goes without saying, does not subscribe to this absolutist 
emphasis on “the relation of the worker to production” as the ur-form of human alienation. This 
relation most certainly counts as one of the primary forms of human being’s alienation, but it is 
by no means the only, or absolute, form: “Anarchism emphasizes that people have the drive for 
freedom. The desire to abolish oppression,” including the systematized oppression of capitalism, 
“is thus a universal characteristic of all people regardless of their class,” which is why the 
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anarchist orientation towards a communal future “does not emerge from theory but from a 
natural instinct” for liberation (Vodovnik, 107). 
Above all, anarchism stresses that the alienation of human being occurs in all uneven 
relations of power, which is as good as saying power relations writ large. This is because such 
uneven relations invariably institute a disequilibrium in the distribution of the two principles that, 
for anarchism, are the conditions for the unalienated expression and flourishing of being: 
equality and liberty. In many Western countries today, for instance, especially the United States, 
the rotted conditions of liberal democratic state governance have laid bare gross, systemic social 
and economic inequalities that are necessarily “resolved” by the restriction of liberty through the 
erection of massive surveillance and policing apparatuses designed to repress those whose 
liberties are already stolen by intersecting systems of economic domination, racism, patriarchy, 
etc. This seemingly confirms anarchism’s condemnation of liberalism as a political philosophy 
whose systems of law and state governance cannot help but pit liberty and equality against each 
other, often undermining both in the name of “security.” “While anarchism would seem to share 
with liberalism an insistence on individual freedom and self-determination,” Saul Newman 
writes, “it exposes in this the very inconsistency of liberalism itself: individual autonomy cannot 
be realised in conditions of inequality, nor under the domination of private property. Nor can it 
be realised through the state and law” (17). On the other hand, “actually-existing” state socialism 
frequently demonstrated the impossibility of safeguarding individual liberty when economic and 
social equality is enforced by hierarchical institutions that, by default, veer towards authoritarian 
and centralizing tendencies. Anarchism shares with socialism a celebration of equality not just in 
terms of individual civic rights, but in economic and social terms as well; however, it despises 
socialism’s drive to suffocate individual autonomy while, at the same time, creating centralized 
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state machines that amplify the unequal concentration of power. There is, thus, no room for 
compromise when it comes to what anarchism sees as the ultimate “truth” of politics: without the 
radical insistence on the mutual affirmation of liberty and equality, no political system can 
prevent itself from eating away at both. As Balibar writes, “There are no examples of restrictions 
or suppressions of freedoms without social inequalities, nor of inequalities without restrictions or 
suppressions of freedoms, be it only to put down resistance, even if there are degrees, secondary 
tensions, phases of unstable equilibrium, and compromise situations in which exploitation and 
domination are not homogeneously distributed across all individuals” (49). 
Nevertheless, in exposing these philosophical and practical contradictions, anarchism 
aims not to negate both liberalism and socialism so much as expose the conditional necessities 
without which neither system can be what human beings and society need. Each represents a 
failed attempt to account for what, in Balibar’s terms, is “the proposition of equaliberty,” which 
“is indeed an irreversible truth, discovered by and in the revolutionary struggle—precisely the 
universally true proposition on which, at the decisive moment, the different forces making up the 
revolutionary camp had to agree. In turn, the historical effects of this proposition, however 
contradictory they may be, can only be understood in this way, as the effects of a truth or effects 
of truth” (48). The proposition of equaliberty is, for anarchism, nothing less than the proposition 
of the dignity of human life and the unalienated expression of human being as “the truth-effect 
without which there is no revolutionary politics.” Thus, in its extension of the ontological 
proposition of equaliberty to the point of its fullest lived and material realization—to the point at 
which, at last, equality and liberty can only be thought together, as the essential complements to 
each other, without which neither can express itself to the greatest possible degree—to the point 
at which a voluntaristic, self-regulating social arrangement of mutually free and equal beings can 
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take shape as the natural expression of human being and cohabitation unshackled by the forces of 
alienation—we could consider, as Saul Newman does in The Politics of Postanarchism, that 
anarchism may be interpreted as “the ultimate horizon,” not only of Marxism, but, indeed, of 
“All forms of radical politics,” so defined (18). 
 Anarchism, Newman contends, “is more than a political and philosophical tradition—it 
also constitutes a universal horizon of emancipation which all forms of radical politics must 
necessarily speak to if they are to remain radical. Anarchism, in other words, contains a beyond, 
a moment of its own transcendence, when it exceeds the discursive limits and ontological 
foundations within which it was originally conceived and opens itself up to a multitude of 
different voices and possibilities” (20) (emphases added). Newman draws a pretty radical 
conclusion here: while the “political and philosophical tradition” of anarchism eventually runs 
aground against the essentialism of its own principles, the spirit of anarchism points beyond 
itself, towards “its own transcendence.” Historically, in practice, anarchist collectivities have 
often succumbed to the very same authoritarian tendencies that anarchists identified in organized 
socialism. As George Lichtheim notes, while accusing Marxists of supporting modes of 
centralized organization that concentrate power in the hands of intellectual and bureaucratic 
vanguards at the expense of democratic functioning, anarchism’s own conspiratorial 
revolutionary cells in the nineteenth century “dispensed with all democratic process,” expelling 
those who deviated from or questioned the convictions of leaders like Bakunin. “No secret 
society could operate unless it was willing to subordinate itself to a self-appointed directorate 
invested with powers of life and death over its followers” (135). Most notably, this practical 
tendency would come to a head in the rash of terrorist bombings and assassinations by anarchists 
in Russia (1881), Spain (1893), France (1894), London (1894), the United States (1901), etc. “In 
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the existential moment of the terrorist act, anarchist secrecy and violence produced the purest 
authoritarianism” (Eley, 95). Nevertheless, as Newman maintains, there remains a sort of 
principial wormhole that allows for anarchy to transcend the “discursive limits and ontological 
foundations” of anarchism, which are highlighted in such pointed moments of political and 
philosophical contradiction. 
Thus far, we have been discussing the iterations of so-called “classical anarchism,” 
which, for a time around the turn of the twentieth century, had managed to assert itself as the 
righteous symbol of left internationalism. While there are many proto-anarchist strands of 
political and religious philosophy, stretching back to the Taoists of ancient China, classical 
anarchism’s historical becoming would emerge in conversation with intellectual and social shifts 
that concretized the sublime objects of its formal opposition. “It required the collapse of 
feudalism in order for anarchism to develop as a coherent ideology,” Marshall explains, "an 
ideology which combined the Renaissance’s growing sense of individualism with the 
Enlightenment’s belief in social progress. It emerged at the end of the eighteenth century in its 
modern form as a response partly to the rise of centralized States and nationalism, and partly to 
industrialization and capitalism” (4). While such developments would help the anarchist spirit 
define itself, they also historicized classical anarchism in a way that would inevitably expose its 
greatest epistemological gaps in the 20th century. Anarchism’s “equal-libertarian and anti-
authoritarian” politics, that is, are still founded on Enlightenment discourses of rationalism and 
humanism; hence the central assurance that “society is constituted by self-regulating natural 
mechanisms, relations and processes that are rational and that, if left alone”—if stripped of the 
unnatural, “inauthentic” forces of alienation—“allow a more harmonious social order to emerge” 
(Newman, 37). This essentialist view of the rational foundation of human nature—coupled with 
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a strong, positivist, scientific-materialist perspective—runs through the works of William 
Godwin, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and other anarchist thinkers. As Bakunin himself writes, “real 
science, materialism and socialism […] are bound to end in the establishment of the greatest 
freedom of individuals and the highest form of human morality” (“Truly Human,” 146). This 
positivist grounding defined what would be one of the most essential works of classical 
anarchism, Mutual Aid, in which Kropotkin rejected not only the contemporary and fashionable 
utilitarian arguments of “social Darwinism” but the long tradition of political philosophy 
founded on a view of human nature as inherently competitive, vicious, and in need of a 
supplementary authoritative body—implemented through a supposedly voluntary “social 
contract”—to regulate it in the name of maintaining social peace and order. Instead of a constant 
war of all against all, Kropotkin argued, nature was brimming with proof of intra-species 
cooperation and common good. In the long run, “the practice of solidarity proves much more 
advantageous to the species than the development of individuals endowed with predatory 
inclinations. The cunningest and the shrewdest are eliminated in favour of those who understand 
the advantages of sociable life and mutual support” (Mutual Aid, 17). 
There is, thus, a certain essentialism at the heart of most iterations of classical anarchism, 
which take as a given that society and human nature itself embody an immanent rationality and 
morality that are scientifically observable. The primary exception is the existentialist anarchism 
of Max Stirner, who famously wrote, “To know and acknowledge essences alone and nothing but 
essences, that is religion; its realm is a realm of essences, spooks, and ghosts” (The Ego and Its 
Own, 41). (Stirner’s expressed aversion to essences might seem to contradict his belief in the 
human struggle to “re-win” its “naturalness,” but his is an aversion to “essences alone and 
nothing but essences”; insofar as Stirner believes in a human essence, it has more to do with the 
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innate human desire to be free of the alienating forces of hierarchically arranged life—to be free 
to express that freedom as an individual, a fundamentally singular and anti-essentialist unit of 
being.) Such essentialism underlies the classical anarchist conviction that the social life of 
humanity contains “the seeds of its own emancipation, as well as the potential to organise itself 
without political power. It also provides the basis for the anarchist understanding of equal-
liberty: freedom understood collectively and realised on the basis of an essential human 
commonality between people, forming the foundations for solidarity and community” (Newman, 
39). But, again, this objective, scientific-materialist understanding of humanity’s social essence 
is founded on the authority of rationalist-humanist beliefs in: the teleological laws of human 
progress, the progressive enlightenment of the individual, the immanent logic of social life and 
the natural principle of mutual aid, etc. Such beliefs have, over the course of the past century, 
undergone repeated deconstructions that have exposed their conditional grounds, their contingent 
epistemological dependence on hegemonizing discourses of normalized (Eurocentric, patriarchal, 
racial, etc.) power. To interrogate these rationalist-humanist principles is to probe the truth of 
their contingency and instrumentality within historically situated discourses (as opposed to their 
universal truth beyond history itself), to approach the sense that, as Michel Foucault writes, 
“there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret but 
the secret that they have no essence, or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion 
from alien forms” (353). 
Moreover, once such principles are unmoored from their universalist foundations, once 
their seeming totality comes into view as historical-ephocal contingency, their founding function 
as a grounds for determining how one should act is thrown into crisis. Indeed, as Reiner 
Schürmann argues in his reading of Heidegger, this crisis is coterminous with the crossing of the 
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historical threshold from which the metaphysical linkage between principles and acting can itself 
be interrogated and deconstructed in such fashion. This threshold, which, according to 
Schürmann, is instituted by the age of technology, signals “the closed unity of the metaphysical 
epoch,” the systematic closure of the age of humanity in which, throughout successive historical 
epochs, the metaphysical relation—by which human action (practical philosophy) conforms to 
the determining power of higher principles (first philosophy)—was taken for granted. “If in the 
epoch of post-modernity (in short, since Nietzsche) the question of presence no longer seems 
capable of articulating itself as a first philosophy, and if the strategy of the concept of 
‘presencing’ in Heidegger annihilates the quest for a complete possession of self by self, it is in 
the epochal constellation of the twentieth century that the ancient procession and legitimation of 
praxis from theōria comes to exhaustion. Then, in its essence, action proves to be an-archic” 
(Schürmann, On Being and Acting, 4). To put this in the context of classical anarchism, the 
“epochal constellation of the twentieth century” brings us to a breakage point at which the kinds 
of first principles on which classical anarchism relies in order to assert its truth are 
deconstructed, thus revealing their rationalist-humanist foundations as contingent articulations of 
a will to universalization and timeless permanence (“permanent presence”) that are themselves 
the product of a shifting history. Indeed, from the vantage point of the twentieth century, all such 
principles take their place in the successive history of metaphysically arranged epochs; we can 
historicize the metaphysical relation itself from “outside the fief where presencing functions as 
constant presence, as identity of self with self, as unshakable ground” (Schürmann, On Being 
and Acting, 4). From Plato to present day, Schürmann writes, “Western civilization has been 
placed under the control of metaphysical ‘stamps’ (Prägungen), under the control of […] 
epochal principles” (On Being and Acting, 17). Each successive epoch in the history of 
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metaphysics, that is, can be observed to have situated human life within hegemonic arrangements 
that shaped and adjusted the scope and purpose of living, thinking, doing, and being in 
accordance with an archē of first principles, which ontologically justified the shape said 
hegemonic arrangements took. But “the history of epochs is drawing to a close,” Schürmann 
contends, and so goes with it the metaphysical relation by which action during a given epoch can 
reliably be arranged, ordered, and directed by such principles. 
What, then, is the fate of anarchism in the age of an-archē? Even if we accept the 
argument that anarchism exists not only as a form of radical politics, but as “the ultimate horizon 
of all forms of radical politics […] an end point or limit condition for the politics of 
emancipation” (Newman, 29), it would seem that such a position still derives from rational-
humanist principles whose will to permanence cannot escape their own historical contingency 
and finitude. It may very well be the case that anarchism, as Schürmann himself argues, is 
destined for the dustbin of the history of metaphysics, destined to remain a system of thought and 
action produced within the metaphysical relation that ties action to the defining ground, the 
archē, of first principles. It may be the case that, at “the end of the history of being,” the 
“principle of an-archē” turns on and inevitably deconstructs all modes of metaphysical thought, 
including anarchism. But one could argue that the spirit of anarchism is already pregnant with 
the deconstruction of its own metaphysical relation—that, even within its classical iteration, 
anarchism’s radical anti-authoritarianism, along with its inbuilt drive to strip away all “artificial” 
forces of alienation, points beyond itself, to the horizon of an-archē.  
 
************************** 
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In his monumental study of Heidegger, Schürmann speaks from the void that 
“deconstructs action.” The basic problem is as old as Plato and Aristotle: the presumed 
(metaphysical) unity between thinking and acting, by which thinking entails securing a rational 
foundation “upon which one may establish the sum total of what is knowable” and, thus, 
organizing the ground and purpose for acting (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, 1). More 
simply, the problem is the presupposition that action (“What is to be done?”) follows 
programmatically from thought (i.e., from within a matrix of the thinkable wherein one’s reasons 
for acting a certain way are derived), while thought itself is grounded in, adjusted to, and shaped 
by the principles articulated in a hegemonic first philosophy (archē). What Heidegger achieved, 
according to Schürmann, was a radical deconstruction of this traditional coupling; that is, of 
metaphysics as a historically contingent phenomenon (or, rather, a phenomenon in which human 
expressions of the seemingly timeless question of being are revealed to be marked by the 
historicity of the particular language and circumstances of their expression). “‘Metaphysics’ is 
then the title for that ensemble of speculative efforts with a view to a model, a canon, a 
principium for action” (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, 4). Deconstructed, such an ensemble 
appears “as a closed field,” which is to say that the purportedly transcendental-universal 
principles organizing every previous philosophy of action are shown to be finite, epochal, 
historically contingent—“historical constellations of presencing” whose first principles give 
them “cohesion, a coherence which, for a time, holds unchallenged” before “its hold [eventually] 
loosens, giving way to the establishment of a new order” (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, 25). 
Moreover, as already mentioned, the deconstructive “hypothesis of closure” is itself a historical 
product of the “epochal constellation” of the twentieth century, since, as Schürmann argues, “the 
deconstructionist discourse can arise only from the boundary of the era over which it is 
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exercised” (On Being and Acting, 4). “The starting point,” he continues, “is the hypothesis of 
‘the end of the history of being,’ the end of that history of presencing in which ‘being lies in 
destiny.’ Its ending is technology, understood not as a set of tools for some people’s material 
culture—as one would speak of Roman or medieval technology—but as the phenomenal 
configuration of the twentieth century” (On Being and Acting, 17). 
Theories of action depend on “what prevails as ultimate knowledge in each epoch” within 
what Schürmann calls the “attributive-participative schema” (i.e. the naturalized relation entailed 
in seeking an origin for action—a program—and a reason for being in an archē). “The prime 
schema which practical philosophy has traditionally borrowed from first philosophy is the 
reference to an archē” (On Being and Acting, 5). When translated into the doctrines of praxis, 
this schema essentially narrows the matrix of possible ways of acting—and possible reasons for 
acting that way—down to a “focal point”; that is, to an archē that is the general condition of 
intelligibility for all thinking and acting that is guided by a “Why?” (In Broken Hegemonies, 
Schürmann describes this general condition of intelligibility as the discursive contexts 
constituting “the phenomenality of phenomena” [6]). What Heidegger and Schürmann’s 
deconstruction shows is that this “focal point is continually displaced throughout history: ideal 
city, heavenly kingdom, the happiness of the greatest number, noumenal and legislative freedom, 
‘transcendental pragmatic consensus’ (Apel), etc.” (On Being and Acting, 5). This is to say that 
the history of metaphysics—the history of people posing the ostensibly universal and timeless 
question of being—can be broken up into historical epochs differentiated from one another by 
the hegemonic hold of their respective epoch-defining archai conditioning the conditions out of 
which the question of being could be articulated. Regardless of the changing loci of these focal 
points, though, the attributive-participative schema remains a normative pattern in the history of 
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Western metaphysics: “The archē always functions in relation to action as a substance functions 
in relation to its accidents, imparting to them sense and telos” (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, 
5).  
As Sergio Villalobos-Ruminott writes, Schürmann develops an understanding of 
“philosophy as an epochal organization of the history of being, where a ‘philosophical epoch,’ is 
organized around a series of first principles that work as nomic injunctions determining 
hegemonic configurations of meaning, articulated by a fantasmatic referent (The One, Nature, 
Consciousness)” (“Anarchy as the Closure”). Such fantasmatic referents are the designata that 
give sense to life, serving as the fundament of reason within any given historical epoch, the 
conditions of “the phenomenality of phenomena”—of the appearing of the world to us and of our 
sensing and understanding of (and how to be in) it. They hold the world together (as it appears to 
us); they make it livable. They answer the burning question of being: “Why?”3 In so doing, 
however, they draw being forth (“bringing to presence”) into the concrete particularity of the 
epochal constellation, into the historical epochality of the language in which the question of 
being can be posed in the first place. In fact, this constitutes the tragic nature of philosophy itself: 
striving to think the question of being in its timeless essence within the fantasmatic restrictions 
of one’s historical episteme, grasping to articulate its seeming universality within the 
grammatical limits of one’s epochally particular language. This is the “price fantasms [charge to] 
render the world livable. Life is paid for by denying the singular; according to the vocabulary of 
apriorism by subsuming it under the figure of the particular” (Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, 
 
3 “The principles answer the question, Why? Why do people in a given epoch speak about, act 
upon, suffer from phenomena the way they do? The principles, which are arch-present in their 
respective epochal orders, provide the reasons for all that is the case, whether lofty or lowly, within 
that order” (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, 39). 
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7). In the history of such tragic articulations of the question of being, the epochal media are the 
message. 
The history of being thus becomes a history of coding; a history, that is, whereby a given 
epochal hegemony administers orders of intelligibility (“economy of presencing”) and authority 
in accordance with the “nomic injunctions” issued by “fantasmatic” first-principial referents. 
What I will argue in this dissertation—and what I hope the following chapters will 
demonstrate—is that these epochal hegemonies don’t just come from nowhere, nor do they settle 
their regimes of intelligibility all at once. When I say “the history of being thus becomes a 
history of coding,” what I mean is that the historical erection of metaphysical economies of 
presencing happens through the (im)material arrangements of society that mediate being itself. 
The process of becoming and maintaining hegemony is actuated—takes place—through medial 
technologies that code, order, and execute the nomic injunctions of fantasmatic referents. Such 
technologies are the very functional means by which epochal hegemonies are sedimented and 
administered. Thus, insofar as the historicity of epochal hegemonies is revealed in the 
historically particular medium of the expression of the question of being (“the vocabulary of 
apriorism” subsumed “under the figure of the particular”), the technics of being are revealed in 
the historically particular media through which hegemony is made manifest in historical reality 
as it shapes, conditions, and flows through the inter-penetrative, mutually open circuits between 
human and world. For this point to make sense, though, we need to seriously expand our 
understanding of media, which I will argue for presently.  
Moreover, if we are to think (let alone practice) a politics that intervenes in the medial 
arrangement of hegemony—a politics that aims to break, adjust, or radically reshape the 
hegemonic arrangements that mediate the conditions of human being’s alienation—there are 
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more questions to answer regarding how (and Why?) to do it. Because, as Schürmann writes, it is 
precisely in our epochal constellation—once the deconstruction of metaphysics has historicized 
what presented itself as foundational in the past, once the supposedly derivative relation between 
first philosophy (theōria) and practical philosophy (praxis) has itself begun to close—that the 
discourse on action is left dangling. Whence action in the post-metaphysical epoch? Or, more 
specifically, what of action “bereft of archē”—that is, anarchy? “The schema of reference to an 
archē then reveals itself to be the product of a certain type of thinking, of an ensemble of 
philosophic rules that have their genesis, their period of glory, and that today perhaps are 
experiencing a decline” (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, 5). 
It is here that the conceptual foundations, not only of anarchism, but of any semblance of 
a radical left, is most vulnerable. Is “the left,” understood in the broadest terms, an epochal 
constellation of presencing whose archē has already been historically displaced? And what was it 
to begin with? What are the focal points around which doctrines of “leftist” praxis (violent, 
legislative, communicative, etc.) have been ordered? Communism? Equaliberty? Justice? 
Dignity? Many of the same deconstructive thinkers who have advanced Heidegger’s hypothesis 
of closure have struggled mightily with the will to hold onto the left as something (a presencing) 
with staying power (permanent presence), if not for its first principles or its practical philosophy, 
then for its “orientation” and “openness.” “One may add,” Schürmann writes: “if logos 
designates the structure of the constellation in and by which beings are near one another at any 
moment of the synchronic cut, and not the ‘reason’ enduring beyond all breaks and ruptures, it 
seems difficult to insert Heidegger within onto-theo-teleological logocentrism” (On Being and 
Acting, 8). Rather than a transcendental (“onto-theo-teleological”) foundation, “there is no unity 
of action except that which characterizes an epoch” (On Being and Acting, 8). Is there, then, 
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nothing left to do but to historicize—that is, deconstruct—the logos that has determined the 
structure of the epochal constellation called the left? 
This is where anarchism, as the potential horizon of the radical, is put to the greatest test. 
Because, as previously mentioned, the spirit of anarchism aims not only to deconstruct the 
metaphysical constellations that legitimize the hierarchical institution of external and “artificial” 
power, but to call forth the deconstruction of its own metaphysical relation. Anarchism speaks a 
language whose logical conclusion—whose horizon—is the “principle” of an-archē itself, the 
ultimate “force of dislocation, of plurification” by which the “referential logos becomes 
‘archipelagic speech,’ ‘pulverized poem’” (On Being and Acting, 6). Anarchism is not negated 
by an-archē; rather, it is fulfilled by it. For Schürmann, it goes without saying that his definition 
of an-archē is not “a question of anarchy in the sense of Proudhon, Bakunin,” and the disciples of 
classical anarchism: 
 
What these masters sought was to displace the origin, to substitute the ‘rational’ 
power, principium, for the power of authority, princeps—as metaphysical an 
operation as has ever been. They sought to replace one focal point with another. 
The anarchy that will be at issue here is the name of a history affecting the ground 
or foundation of action, a history where the bedrock yields and where it becomes 
obvious that the principle of cohesion, be it authoritarian or ‘rational’, is no longer 
anything more than a blank space deprived of legislative, normative power (On 
Being and Acting, 6). 
 
Schürmann confirms what we have explored thus far; namely, that anarchism’s supreme drive to 
negate “the power of authority” in all its alienating forms is still founded on the presumed 
metaphysical permanence of rationalist-humanist principles. For all of anarchism’s expressed 
anti-authoritarianism, its core principles nevertheless impose the same authoritative (“attributive-
participative”) schema of all metaphysics, whereby action is apparently directed by a relation of 
fidelity to a first philosophy. In its classical form, anarchism’s antagonism to human alienation is 
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dependent on a rationalist-humanist ideation of natural, un-alienated being whose flourishing can 
at last come to be when the forces that alienate it are stripped away. But Schürmann may, in fact, 
be mistaking the cart for the horse. 
Schürmann writes off anarchism’s adherence to “rational power” as just another origin 
among others authoritatively instituting the metaphysical relation between theōria and praxis. In 
other words, Schürmann counts anarchism as one of many metaphysical systems that organizes 
itself around the archē, as principium (“principle of intelligibility”)—in this case, the principle of 
rational power—and princeps (“the principle in its function as [institutional] authority”) (On 
Being and Acting, 26). But this directly contradicts one of the primary conditions of anarchism as 
such: the negation of institutional authority writ large. In discussing the ancient Inca empire, for 
instance, Schürmann notes that “as the first in the order of authority, the princeps [of this society] 
was the political apparatus with the supreme cacique exercising vertical control at its head” (On 
Being and Acting, 28). Throughout the history of new and passing epochal constellations of 
presencing—epochs whose orders of intelligibility are “onto-theo-teleologically” organized 
around core first principles, which strive for universality and permanence, and whose 
metaphysical relation is embodied and enforced by some form of institutional authority—each 
constellation bears the stamp of a new principium, manifesting its power in a different princeps. 
But what, to ask the blunt question, would be the princeps in the constellation of anarchism when 
anarchism rejects all princepes? What is the destiny of a metaphysical system that has built into 
itself a radical negation of all institutional systematicity, which, if taken to its logical conclusion, 
would even negate its own metaphysical foundations? Because the anti-authoritarian spirit of 
anarchism points to a horizon beyond itself, beyond the rationalist-humanist founding of its 
classical iteration. It does not stop, as Schürmann believes, at the bedrock of rational power, but 
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persists to the radical horizon from which, like an autoimmune disease, it attacks the 
authoritative relation to first principles itself. Such ecstatic movement would begin to manifest 
most forcefully in the radical movements of the 1960s and ‘70s, which, though deconstructing 
classical anarchism’s essentialist foundations, still loudly proclaimed themselves to be anarchist 
in nature. 
The anti-authoritarian spirit of anarchism, if taken to its logical conclusion, inevitably 
performs a kind of autophagy, turning inward and eating away at the very principial authority of 
its rationalist-humanist foundations. This is also the basis for the claim that said spirit is already 
pregnant with the metaphysical deconstruction itself, which devours the authoritative relation by 
which action is determined by first principles, and which has as its own horizon the epochal 
constellation of an-archē, of acting without principle, of “being ‘without why.’” Another way of 
saying this is that the epochal constellation of an-archic action that Schürmann and Heidegger 
envision becomes possible at the same endpoint of anarchism taken to its radical conclusion—
the two meet at the horizon.  
Anarchism’s philosophical armature is indeed grounded in first principles that 
essentialize the rational foundations of human nature in problematic, limited, and historically 
contingent ways, but the presupposition of such foundations must be understood less as a 
limiting grounds for determining “proper” action and more as a condition of possibility for 
living, at last, beyond the capture of principial authority. To borrow a term from Stevphen 
Shukaitis, we might better understand these foundational principles as “imaginal machines” that 
perform the crucial technical function of spacing, that provide an ontological cut, which, in turn, 
clears a path for acting. For instance, “the backwards projection of the existence of an 
autonomous subject, collectivity and capacity […] is integral to creating the conditions for the 
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possible realization of an autonomous existence in the present. The existence of an already 
present form of autonomy is part of a process of mythological self-creation and institution that 
needs to be assessed based on its ability to animate forms of autonomy and self-organization” 
(26). Such mytho-poetic tools may rely on the necessary grounding functionality of metaphysical 
principles—in the vein of what Gayatri Spivak calls “strategic essentialism,” or, for that matter, 
what Alain Badiou describes as the militant subject’s fidelity to the event—even if that ground is 
acknowledged as illusory or conditional. “To live the everyday life of revolution is certainly a 
dangerous task, one fraught sometimes with very necessary illusions, allusions, and delusions” 
(Shukaitis, 59). To put this another way, in its historical iterations, anarchism’s founding in 
metaphysical principles may not determine the acts and forms of resistance so much as open the 
space for them. 
What is especially notable here is that we are, once again, within the scope of what 
Schürmann and Heidegger articulate as the conditions of an-archē. Schürmann’s study “reads 
Heidegger backwards,” as it were, in order to link his earlier and later writings along the axis of a 
lifelong, unfolding attempt “to think presencing explicitly as plural” (On Being and Acting, 14). 
In so doing, Schürmann notes that, even in Being and Time, Heidegger’s thoroughly existentialist 
phenomenological focus is implanted with the same, if latent, concern in his later writings for 
“the ‘belonging together of man and being’ as it varies from epoch to epoch. As a method of 
procedure, this is still an explication” (On Being and Acting, 237). Such an explication of “the 
belonging together of man and being” depends on the radical assertion of what Schürmann calls 
the “practical a priori,” which aims to avoid the ‘methodical’ errancy” of metaphysics, “which 
substitutes the contingency of time for the consolations of the eternal or the permanent presence 
of consciousness and forgets about its humble and historical origins” (Schrijvers, 421). With the 
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practical a priori, Schürmann asserts the “priority of praxis and everyday experience” by 
showing how “a mode of thinking is made dependent on a mode of living.” This is to say that, in 
the “methodical” analysis of epochal economies of presencing, the thinking of historical subjects 
can only ever be a thinking in response to the conditions of the epoch they inhabit. No one in the 
Stone Age was dreaming of stainless steel sheers, nor were members of the Greek polis 
imagining battles over campaign finance reform, and so on: “one thinks correctly only that to 
which one belongs: the economies of presencing” (On Being and Acting, 42) (emphases added). 
And such epochal fidelity of thought reigns up until the point that … it doesn’t.  
Each hegemonic epochal economy is dominated by a “supreme referent,” which holds 
unchallenged as both principium and princeps until its hegemonic hold withers away. “As long 
as its economy dominates, and as long as its order disposes the paths that life and thought follow, 
one speaks otherwise than when its hold loosens, giving way to the establishment of a new order 
[…] When the habitat which has transitorily become ours decays and falls, questions previously 
unheard of, questions hitherto incapable of being asked, surge forth” (On Being and Acting, 25). 
For Schürmann, the phenomenological notion of a practical a priori asserts the possibility of the 
primacy of acting over thinking—to think within a given epoch is to respond to the experienced 
conditions of a “habitat,” to an ordered matrix of principial authority that “disposes the paths that 
life and thought follow.” However, within our current epochal constellation, within the 
technological epoch of the “metaphysical closure,” there is a lived contest playing out between 
the capture of the residual forces of “unthinking” and the “authentic” thinking of being that the 
technological epoch has itself made possible. The age of technology implements a two-pronged 
path of possibility: while unmooring the metaphysical relation in a way that opens up the 
thinking of metaphysical epochality, the ordering of modern technology also opens up the lived 
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haze of objectified unthinking. There is no guarantee whatsoever that the thinking of being will 
emerge on its own: “to exist an-archically is the condition, the practical a priori, for the 
understanding of the origin as an-archic” (Schürmann, “Questioning the Foundation, 367). 
“To understand authentic temporality,” Schürmann writes, “it is necessary to ‘exist 
authentically’; to think being as letting phenomena be, one must oneself ‘let all things be’; to 
follow the play without why of presencing, it is necessary to ‘live without why’” (On Being and 
Acting, 287). In order to think being without authoritatively imposing on it a “why,” in order to 
understand “the origin as an-archic” at the threshold of the metaphysical closure, it is necessary 
to act an-archically, to respond to the epochal conditions of the technological age by existing 
“authentically,” stripped of the alienating forces that obscure the disclosure of being from us. 
“One has to be perfectly detached in order to allow for the rise of an order of things that is 
detached from any first principle, that is utterly contingent—in ‘humanistic’ terms, in order to 
bring about a generation no longer preoccupied with ultimate foundations” (“Questioning the 
Foundation, 365). “To the question, What is to be done? when raised together with the question, 
What is being? a radical phenomenologist can only respond: dislodge all vestiges of a teleocratic 
economy from their hideouts—in common sense as much as in ideology—and thereby liberate 
things from the ‘ordinary concept’ which ‘captures’ them under ultimate representations” (On 
Being and Acting, 280). This, as I’ve already suggested, is the point on the radical horizon at 
which anarchism and an-archē touch. How to get there—that is the real question. 
 
************************** 
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In the chapters that follow, I aim to demonstrate a method for analyzing the history of the 
media politics of radical leftists—a method that is, at the moment, tentative, very much 
incomplete, and definitely at risk of seeming absurd at points, but it’s my hope that 
demonstrating such a method will be useful in the collective project of developing and practicing 
a leftist media politics that approaches the radical horizon of an-archē, of “being without ‘why.’” 
Even if they are not stated explicitly, these are the terms with which I trace the deconstructive 
movements and media politics of the Partido Liberal Mexicano (embodied in its party organ, 
Regeneración) in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century as well as those of the 
Partido Comunista Mexicano in the 1920s.   
Taking up Schürmann and Heidegger’s notion of a practical a priori, it follows that to 
think an-archically—to “think being as letting phenomena be”—requires a comportment that 
makes such thinking possible: “a particular kind of acting appears as the condition for 
understanding being […] Here praxis determines thinking” (On Being and Acting, 287). 
Heidegger prescribes no semblance of a program for such praxis, which would seemingly be a 
contradiction, but he does lay out its conditions: 
 
action turns into a condition that needs to be fulfilled in concreto for thought—the 
thought of being—to be at all possible. The transcendental inversion does not 
rehabilitate humanism, this time under a practical guise. The economies of 
presence unfold with little human control. Thinking may choose to remain 
enfolded in its given fold, without raising a question about it, the question of 
being. What it cannot choose is to dis-imply itself from its historical ply. But it 
can free itself from mute implication. It can begin to question. In Heidegger, the 
conditions for so emerging from the slumber of thoughtlessness are that action 
take explicit aim at all principial vestiges, that it challenge and subvert their 
sway, and that this subversion be collective (On Being and Acting, 244) 
(emphases added). 
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No form of thinking can escape its imbrication in the “historical ply” by which it is determined 
as a response to its “given [epochal] fold.” Moreover, according to Schürmann, it is not up to 
thinking to determine the unfolding or shape of each new economy of presence. But in the epoch 
of the metaphysical deconstruction, thinking does have a choice to shake itself from “the slumber 
of thoughtlessness,” to gain a voice and question the metaphysical relation itself. Such a choice, 
again, is not a given. It requires, first, “that action take explicit aim at all principial vestiges” and, 
second, that its subversion of the authoritative sway of these vestiges “be [a] collective” process. 
“Due to the encompassing character of any destinal or historical ‘stamp’ of presence, a challenge 
to the principles by marginal, individual actions cannot, by right, transfer us into the economy of 
Ereignis. The scope of the imperative that requires us to ‘open ourselves to the injunction’ is 
therefore societal” (On Being and Acting, 244). Is this not, as we’ve described it, the modus 
operandi of anarchism (which is also its modus vivendi)? The praxis of anarchism is one that, in 
its resistance to the alienating forces of authoritative power, takes “explicit aim at all principial 
vestiges,” even, eventually, those that belong to classical anarchism itself. While such action 
may make use of the “imaginal machines” of first metaphysical principles (“rational power”), we 
could also say that the action of resistance is the practical a priori for anarchism’s “emerging 
from the slumber of thoughtlessness,” for its eventual deconstruction of the authoritative relation 
to metaphysical foundations, including those upon which classical anarchism itself is based. 
Moreover, and most importantly, the praxis of anarchism embodies and enacts the condition of 
collective subversion that Heidegger and Schürmann emphasize. Anarchism understands, 
perhaps better than any other political philosophy, that to act—to take aim at, to resist, and to 
strip away the alienating vestiges of principial authority—is necessarily a matter of what Peter 
Sloterdijk calls anthropotechnics. 
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In You Must Change Your Life, Sloterdijk drastically asserts that “Anyone who speaks of 
human self-production without addressing the formation of human beings in the practising life 
has missed the point from the outset. Consequently, we must suspend virtually everything that 
has been said about humans as working beings in order to translate it into the language of 
practising, or self-forming and self-enhancing behaviour” (4) Such an assertion extends 
Sloterdijk’s decades-long project to upend the epistemological rendering of the human as a self-
contained agential being that acts in the world as such, for which he substitutes the 
immunological notion of the human as the necessary creator of the world in which it can be. “I 
gather material on the biography of Homo immunologicus, guided by the assumption that this is 
where to find the stuff from which the forms of anthropotechnics are made. By this I mean the 
methods of mental and physical practising by which humans from the most diverse cultures have 
attempted to optimize their cosmic and immunological status in the face of vague risks of living 
and acute certainties of death” (Sloterdijk, You Must Change, 10). Sloterdijk argues that human 
life does not and cannot exist on its own, naked, exposed to the barren “outer space” of the 
world. Human “self-production” emerges as a becoming of and through anthropotechnics; that is, 
through the “methods of mental and physical practising” that condition the spaces—spheres—of 
being, that make a home for being in which life can fashion itself, flourish, and protect itself 
from the “vague risks of living and acute certainties of death.” Anthropotechnics is the making of 
the human itself. And humans become and survive “by recreating protective envelopes, which 
constitute immunity, using technological means […] humans have no choice but to build 
spheres. They need protective or immunising systems to survive. In order to exist they need to be 
‘continually working on their accommodation in imaginary, sonorous, semiotic, ritual and 
technical shells. They are, in that sense, interior designers” (Janicka, 65). 
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Moreover, for Sloterdijk, the spatial analytic that such an approach brings to the question 
of human self-fashioning highlights the fact that “being is never an isolated being. Much more 
than is true for Heidegger, being is social. Spatial being is always a co-existence” (Noordegraaf-
Eelens & Schinkel, 12). Thus, what I argue here, and aim to demonstrate in the following 
chapters, is that Sloterdijk’s focus on the anthropotechnical-immunological conditioning of life 
in spheres (“spherology”) provides an essential analytic through which we can understand the 
anarchist media-political praxis of self- and world-fashioning that not only makes it possible to 
think being beyond the metaphysical closure, but that also aims to create the space of and for the 
collective subversion of “the injustice, the hubris, of enforced residence under principial 
surveillance—whatever form it may take” (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, 281). I discuss this 
anthropotechnical conditioning in the context of the political creation and enacting of “resistance 
cultures,” which spherologically mediate the conditions of individual and collective life that aims 
to de-alienate human being from itself (and, thus, to clear a space for “being without why”).  
What Sloterdijkian spherology adds to our reading of Schürmann (and Heidegger) is a 
necessary attention to the space of being, to the anthropotechnical clearing that makes possible 
the thinking of being. Because even an-archē—the a-principial action of “being without 
‘why’”—is and requires the anthropotechnical conditioning of life in spheres. A being without 
“why” does not negate being’s need for a where. Sloterdijk characterizes his inaugural study of 
spherology as a “philosophical anthropotechnical theory of space.” In response to Heidegger’s 
existential analytic, which poses the question of the nature of being, Sloterdijk’s spatial ontology 
counterposes the question: “where is (the human) being?” Whereas Heidegger accepts the human 
as a nature—a being-in-the-world-as-such, a world in solid form—Sloterdijk is concerned with 
the production of worlds, with “the human being’s being-in-the-spheres.” In the history of 
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Western metaphysics, Sloterdijk traces the problematic categories of thought and existence that 
have supported, and have been supported by, notions of human self-contained-ness and of a 
distanced, instrumental relation to the world we’re a part of. Even if we broaden our 
epistemological bases to interrogate these categories in theory (or purely “thematically”) the fact 
remains that “In everyday life, we remain metaphysicians of the hardcore” (Sloterdijk, Neither 
Sun nor Death, 139). We see in solids, we think as singularities. As Sloterdijk asserts, the 
“conception of substance has led us, almost since time immemorial, to look for the essence of the 
world and of life and, to do so as regards only that which can be apprehended in a concrete and 
individual manner, that which has an existence by its matter and its form, that which, in the 
objects and the situations that we encounter, prove themselves always as their essence” (Neither 
Sun nor Death, 139). We move and think and act on the “hardcore” topsoil of the world, on the 
plane of forms from which objects and situations appear as products, not process. What 
Sloterdijk’s spherology aims to do is thus refocus our vision to see that which is not apparent in 
solidified forms, arranged as such in the grocery aisles of phenomenal reality. What we are 
looking for in the study of spheres and their “immunological” dynamics are, instead, “the 
categories of relation, of contact, of suspended flight in a situation of mutual cohabitation, the 
fact of being contained in a ‘between’” (Neither Sun nor Death, 140). 
What Sloterdijk articulates is, I argue, an invitation to develop a media theory of being—
with “media” being fundamentally understood as the technics of living “in a [permanent] 
‘between.’” It’s not for nothing that, in the first volume of his truly massive Spheres trilogy, 
Sloterdijk asserts that the aim of this extensive project is to “show that media theory and sphere 
theory converge: this is a hypothesis for whose proof three books cannot be excessive” (31). 
What we call media—typically in reference to information and communications media—is an 
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exceedingly narrow expression of a concept that encompasses the technicity of life itself. Like 
John Durham Peters, I believe that, “At its most ambitious, media studies sees itself as a 
successor discipline to metaphysics, as the study of all that is” (27). Media connect that which is 
separated, not just by space, but by time—and, even, planes of being. Just like the epochally 
specific metaphysical hegemonies Schürmann describes don’t simply come from nowhere, all 
that lives and changes is conveyed from one state of being to the next by some form of media, by 
some process of mediation, by means and circumstances that exceed what defines them in our 
limited ways of understanding discrete entities by their self-contained essence—as products, not 
processes in constant conversation with the world they’re a part of.  
This more expansive conceptualization of media follows from the work of thinkers like 
Bernard Stiegler and Mark Hansen. In his Technics and Time series, following the work of 
paleontologist André Leroi-Gourhan, Stiegler asserts that human beings have evolved in ways 
that can’t be explained in purely zoological or biological terms. Our evolution inheres in the 
passing on of knowledge through culture, which is made possible (just as history—the elsewhere 
to which we are connected in this “passing on”—is made conceivable) through technics. 
Technical objects are the very support for a cultural, non-biological, “epiphylogenetic” memory. 
Thus, the evolutionary process that has come to define our humanity has been, from the 
beginning, a technical process: 
 
The problem arising here is that the evolution of this essentially technical being 
that the human is exceeds the biological, although this dimension is an essential 
part of the technical phenomenon itself, something like its enigma. The evolution 
of the “prosthesis,” not itself living, by which the human is nonetheless defined as 
a living being, constitutes the reality of the human’s evolution, as if, with it, the 
history of life were to continue by means other than life: this is the paradox of a 
living being characterized in its forms of life by the nonliving—or by the traces 
that its life leaves in the nonliving (Stiegler, 50). 
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Stiegler’s description thus presents human evolution as simultaneously biological and cultural 
and occurs as a process of what he terms “epiphylogenesis”: the evolution of human life “by 
means other than life.” What we call technics, therefore, encompasses the “evolution of the 
‘prosthesis,’” which is, from the beginning, an exteriorization of the living organism in its 
pursuit of life by means other than life. Or, in Sloterdijk’s terms, the exteriorization of the living 
organism is necessarily an anthropotechnical creation of the medial spheres in which humans can 
be that which they are. “The paradox,” Stiegler notes, “is to have to speak of an exteriorization 
without a preceding interior: the interior is constituted in exteriorization […] the appearance of 
the human is the appearance of the technical” (141). For Stiegler, the aporetic relationship 
between the inside and the outside can only be understood as différance—a movement of 
differing and deferral without origin, a transductive synthesis mutually constituting the who and 
the what while giving the illusion of their opposition. For Sloterdijk, this seeming opposition is 
just as much a product of our epistemologically stunted and instrumentalist understanding of 
beings as self-contained entities defined by some internal essence as opposed to beings-in-
process whose processual becoming always implicates their “essence” in their relations to that 
which exceeds what they “are.”  
It is in opposition to this instrumentalist and one-dimensional view of media, the human, 
and the worlds they make together that I hope to position this dissertation and the analytical 
method I practice in the following chapters. In the process, I hope to show that the seeming 
opposition between the two primary competing approaches to media in contemporary cultural 
studies is untenable. On one hand, in the anti-humanist vein of thinkers like Friedrich Kittler, 
there is an approach that privileges the ontological singularity of technical objects and their 
agency in determining the shape and scope of human life (“Media,” as Kittler famously put it, 
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“determine our situation” [xxxix]); on the other hand, thinkers like Michael Warner have 
developed a cultural constructivist approach to media, which places greater weight on the 
discursive encoding of technology and shaping of technological progress (“the practices of 
technology, in other words, are always structured, and [...] their meaningful structure is the 
dimension of culture” [10]); in the middle would be someone like Raymond Williams, whose 
approach is more fluid, but still dialectical (“while we have to reject technological determinism, 
in all its forms, we must be careful not to substitute for it the notion of a determined technology 
[…] the reality of determination is the setting of limits and the exertion of pressures, within 
which variable social practices are profoundly affected but never necessarily controlled” 
[Television, 133]).4 However, as Mark Hansen writes, the analytic of epiphylogenesis presented 
by Stiegler deconstructs the terms of this debate. From this position,  
 
there simply is no such thing as technical determinism, not because technics don’t 
determine our situation, but because they don’t (and cannot) do so from a position 
that is outside of culture; likewise, there is no such thing as cultural 
constructivism—understood as a rigid, blanket privileging of ideology or cultural 
agency—not because culture doesn’t construct ideology and experience, but 
because it doesn’t (and cannot) do so without depending on technologies that are 
beyond the scope of its intentionality, of the very agency of cultural ideology […] 
From this perspective, the medium is, from the very onset, a concept that is 
irrevocably implicated in life, in the epiphylogenesis of the human, and in the 
history to which it gives rise qua history of concrete effects. Thus, long before the 
appearance of the term ‘medium’ in the English language, and also long before 
the appearance of its root, the Latin term medium (meaning middle, center, midst, 
intermediate course, thus something implying mediation or an intermediary), the 
 
4 Whereas Kittler sees a technological autonomy that resists the McLuhan thesis of the medium 
as human prosthesis, Stiegler’s epiphylogenetic analytic, like Sloterdijk’s spherological 
approach, demonstrates that the supposition of such autonomy is itself ideological. This is not to 
deny the internal logics of technical objects, as Gilbert Simondon noted, but Kittler’s anti-
humanism borders on fetishizing as automata that which is fundamentally co-implicated by its 
relation to the human. “Man is capable of taking upon himself the relation between the living 
being that he is and the machine he fabricates; the technical operation requires both technical and 
natural life” (Simondon, 140). As much as he would like to, Kittler can’t erase the human from 
technics any more than we could erase the technicity of the human. 
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medium existed as an operation fundamentally bound up with the living, but also 
with the technical. The medium, we might say, is implicated in the living as 
essentially technical, in [...] ‘technical life’; it is the operation of mediation—and 
perhaps also the support for the always concrete mediation—between a living 
being and the environment. In this sense, the medium perhaps names the very 
transduction between the organism and the environment that constitutes life as 
essentially technical (Hansen, 299-300) 
 
Like Stiegler, Hansen’s destruction of the fiction of an “outside” figures a constant co-
implication of that which is separated (self and world, life and technics, etc.) but cannot be 
defined in any sort of essentialist vacuum. A great philosophical lack of appreciation for this 
necessary co-implication of beings, I argue, is precisely why Sloterdijk writes that “we must 
suspend virtually everything that has been said about humans as working beings in order to 
translate it into the language of practising, or self-forming and self-enhancing behavior” (You 
Must Change, 4). I attempt to model in this dissertation an approach to media and media politics 
that understands both in terms of the anthropotechnics of “practising, or self-forming,” of 
constructing and conditioning the medial spheres that condition us, the spheres that we’re 
embedded in and that mediate human being. What I interpret as radical politics consists of such 
spherological attempts to intervene in the media-worlds that mediate the conditions of human 
alienation and to reshape the medial arrangement of one’s world in ways that approach the 
radical horizon of an-archē, allowing the humanness of being to appear, at last, unalienated from 
itself 
Sloterdijk’s spherology can and, I argue, must be taken together with the Stieglerian 
analytic of epiphylogenesis, as the evolution of the human by and through technics. “The theory 
of spheres,” Sloterdijk writes, “is a morphological tool that allows us to grasp the exodus of the 
human being, from the primitive symbiosis to world-historical action in empires and global 
systems, as an almost coherent history of extraversion” (Spheres, I, 67). As noted above, this 
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“exodus of the human being,” the epiphylogenetic pursuit of life by means other than life, 
comprises the medium as the means of creating and connecting to the world in which the human 
can be that which it is. What Sloterdijk adds in his spherological undertaking is a fundamentally 
plural and spatial dimensionality of such world-making: 
 
If humans are there [being-there], it is initially in spaces that have opened for 
them because, by inhabiting them, humans have given them form, content, 
extension and relative duration. As spheres are the original product of human 
coexistence, however—something of which no theory of work has ever taken 
notice—these atmospheric-symbolic places for humans are dependent on constant 
renewal. Spheres are air conditioning systems in whose construction and 
calibration, for those living in real coexistence, it is out of the question not to 
participate. The symbolic air conditioning of the shared space is the primal 
production of every society (Spheres, I, 46). 
 
From the micro to the macro, Sloterdijk’s spherology is, from the beginning, a study of 
mediation, understood in the sense of “technical life”; that is, an attempt to understand the 
“anthropotechnical” processes and relations of world-making and “air conditioning” that 
constitute “real coexistence.” “We live, as intertwined beings, in the land of We” (Spheres, I, 
51). And we are engaged, every day, in the constant renewal of the “atmospheric-symbolic” 
worlds in which we live. We are, and make, worlds, but worlds also make us. We have evolved, 
through the epiphylogenetic, anthropotechnical, mediatic processes of world-making, but that 
evolution comes with the price of constant renewal: the atmospheres we’ve created contain the 
oxygen of our living. We cannot simply exist in the World but must survive in worlds (air 
conditioning systems) that mediate our relation to everything. “Only in immune structures that 
form interiors can humans continue their generational processes and advance their 
individuations. Humans have never lived in a direct relationship with ‘nature,’ and their cultures 
have certainly never set foot in the realm of what we call the bare facts; their existence has 
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always been exclusively in the breathed, divided, torn-open and restored space” (Spheres, I, 46). 
Thus, the reality of being-in-the-world is one in which every term (being/in/world) is taken as 
contingent, processual, atmospheric—mediated. 
This may all seem quite (if not too) abstract for a history of “media” and the “left” in 
Mexico. But, as I hope the following chapters will show, it is entirely necessary. For, in order to 
approach the study of media and the left not as self-contained entities but, rather, as processes in 
conversation with the world, “conceptualizations of that vulnerable oxygen-tent called culture in 
which we exist will be far more cautious, on the one hand, and far more technical, on the other 
[…] Those who want to think no further than the illusion of the lifeworld, who raise no technical 
questions, and who take no part in analyses about how space filled with motivations is possible, 
are […] only passengers, only cultural-service consumers, but not cultural theoreticians”  
(Sloterdijk, Neither Sun nor Death, 217).  
What will it mean, then, to be far more “technical” in our approximation not only of the 
“vulnerable oxygen-tent called culture,” but of traditional signifiers like “politics” and the “left”? 
If anything, Sloterdijk’s imperative does not require that we rid ourselves of such signifiers, but 
that their historical-conceptual value be measured in terms of their spherological capacity; that is, 
their capacity to mediate the conditions of human being. We are looking at the same topics, but 
differently. Atmospherically. We do not need to necessarily scrap our old concepts and 
categories, but the hope of this approach (and all the mistakes I will surely make in developing 
it) is to remove from them their supports of “substance fetishism and metaphysical 
individualism” and see if they float.  
It is within this shift to the atmospheric that Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift attempt to set out 
on a new course to study the left in its engagement with “the political itself as an active field.” 
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Theirs is a study of tactics as opposed to programs, or what they call “arts of the political.” Such 
a study accepts from the beginning that any attempt to understand what the left is, let alone what 
it can and should do to combat the world-sized injustice of human alienation, must not be limited 
to the “substance fetishism” of categorizing ideological allegiances or structured programs for 
materializing the good life, but must also make space to include a conception of “being on the 
left [as] mobilizing world-making capacity” and practicing a concerted media politics through 
which “another world” becomes possible (4). As Amin and Thrift explain, also drawing on 
Sloterdijk’s terminology, “world-making capacity is the ability to produce […] ‘atmospheres,’ 
that is, spaces of resonance in which the oxygen of certain kinds of thought and practice seems 
natural and desirable” (5). 
 As the following chapters will demonstrate, articulating a radical political program can, 
indeed, be an essential component in a robust media politics. But what Ash and Thrift 
demonstrate is that a vision of another world lobbed into the world as it is will bounce and settle 
like a stone if it is not accompanied by more widespread, organized, and interconnected attempts 
to make that vision resonant, conceivable, spreadable, and actionable within the historically, 
locally, and nationally constructed spheres of the people it hopes to mobilize. Such a 
spherological stance, they argue, “is particularly necessary for the Left, for when it has worked 
best in the past, it has done so by inventing new worlds out of the present, disclosing that which 
lies latent, bringing together that which has been dispersed, making explicit that which has 
lacked form or representation, finding the right openings, and working with a map of the future 
whose cardinal is rather like the magnetic North Pole in that it is a fixed point but one that 
constantly moves” (8-9). In the following chapters, it is through this sort of spherological lens 
that I attempt to study the media politics of the Partido Liberal Mexicano, the Partido Comunista 
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Mexicano, and the hegemonic forces they attempted to combat in their collective struggles to 
intervene in and reshape the medial arrangement of the world they were a part of.  
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Chapter II. “Regeneración era el Magonismo” 
 
In his essay on Ricardo Flores Magón, the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), and its official 
newspaper, Regeneración, historian Armando Bartra makes a bold and provocative claim: 
“Magonismo did not use Regeneración, Regeneración was Magonismo” (“Prólogo,” 15). Read 
one way, Bartra’s claim could certainly come across as an indictment of magonismo as a political 
movement that existed only on paper; that is, on the pages of Regeneración itself. However, as I 
argue in this chapter, Bartra actually signals the necessity of seeing Regeneración as the lively site 
of medial connection through which the movement itself lived. As Ricardo and the Organizing 
Junta of the PLM tried to foment and direct the Mexican revolution from exile in the United States, 
and as their politics developed from their more Liberal reformist roots to an open embrace of 
anarcho-communism, the transnational, interconnected medial processes, relations, and networks 
that made it possible to produce, disseminate, and engage with Regeneración in the first place took 
on greater political significance. In order to function as an information-sharing, political education, 
and organizing network, and in order to survive political repression from forces aligned with 
Porfirio Díaz’s dictatorial rule or from U.S. authorities, this sprawling medial infrastructure 
required the kind of widespread participation, cooperation, coordination, etc. that gave evidential 
credence to the PLM’s vision for social revolution and for the creation of a more just world without 
the oppressive forces of capital, clergy, and the state. In this chapter, I examine the diffuse and 
interconnecting dimensions of a concerted media politics that made up the movement of 
magonismo, from networks of Liberal Clubs throughout Mexico to Regeneración itself and the 
 46 
clandestine, transnational medial infrastructure through which it was produced, disseminated, and 
engaged with.  
 
************************** 
 
 
Ricardo Flores Magón and the Organizing Junta of the Mexican Liberal Party have often 
been footnoted in history as being among the most influential “precursors” of the Mexican 
Revolution. They earned this designation as much for the roles they played in motivating, 
organizing, and mobilizing dissenting factions of the Mexican population (and building 
international support for the rebellious cause) as for their articulation of certain political 
grievances and principles that would characterize dominant (post-)revolutionary currents and 
would ultimately be enshrined in the 1917 Constitution (Hodges).  
The PLM grew out of a rising tide of Liberal dissent that would eventually culminate in 
revolutionary inter- and intra-class conflict. At the turn of the 20th century, though, this dissent 
was primarily directed against the creep of resurgent clericalism and embodied a widespread 
anger and fear that, under the reign of Porfirio Díaz, the Church had retaken an unjustly powerful 
position in society (if, indeed, it had ever lost it), operating in open defiance of the 1857 
Constitution and the Reform Laws. In August, 1900, when Camilo Arriaga, a mining engineer 
from a wealthy family in San Luis Potosí, issued his manifesto “Invitación al Partido Liberal” 
with the support of other local Liberals, he called for the organization of a network of Liberal 
Clubs across the country and for a foundational national Congress to take place in San Luis 
Potosí in February, 1901. “The aim of such a meeting would be ‘… to discuss and decide upon 
means to effect the unification, solidarity, and force of the Liberal Party, with the end of 
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containing the advances of clericalism and of achieving, within law and order, an effective 
application of the Reform Laws’” (Cockcroft, 93). Along with the generally middle- and upper-
class makeup of the manifesto’s signatories, the limited scope of the manifesto itself belied the 
Liberal inclination towards a program of political reformism (including Arriaga himself). 
However, the manifesto’s embedded call for “collective action,” along with the vital implications 
that building a Liberal Club network had for organizing a broader national resistance movement, 
made the Party and the prospective Congress attractive to younger, more left-leaning students 
like Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama and Juan Sarabia, who helped found the San Luis Potosí Club, 
which they named “Ponciano Arriaga.”  
This also caught the enthusiastic attention of Ricardo Flores Magón and his brothers in 
Mexico City who, along with Antonio Horcasitas, had established the newspaper Regeneración 
during that same year as an “Independent Juridical Journal” focused on “exposing miscarriages 
of justice, violations of rights guaranteed by the constitution, and corruption in courts under the 
porfiriato” (Cowen Verter, 32). (In 2005, when the Flores Magón brothers and their cadre split 
from the founding Liberal Party to establish the more radical Junta Organizadora del Partido 
Liberal Mexicano [PLM], Regeneración would become their official party organ.) As Enrique 
Flores Magón would recall decades later, “Camilo Arriaga’s initiative excited Ricardo and me 
[…] the formation of Liberal Clubs provided a basis for socialist organization” (qtd. in 
Cockcroft, 95). There was a synergistic continuity between the political-infrastructural project of 
the Liberal Club movement and what would become the project of magonismo as embodied in 
the collective process of producing, disseminating, and engaging with Regeneración. As Gloria 
Villegas Moreno notes, “Una parte esencial de las tareas de los clubes sería celebrar 
conferencias de tema histórico y excitar al ejercicio de sus derechos a los ciudadanos, para 
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infundir al pueblo el civismo, de tal manera supiera éste, que él «es el amo y no el esclavo, y 
aquéllos los mandatarios y no los verdugos ni los déspotas»” (“An essential part of the Clubs’ 
duties would be to hold conferences on historical topics and to encourage citizens to exercise 
their rights, in order to inspire a sense of civic responsibility in the people, so that they would 
know that they were ‘the master and not the slave, and that they were the leaders and neither 
executioners or despots’”) (102). Regeneración and magonismo as such depended on the Liberal 
Club network to survive. Each in their own way comprised an “anthropotechnical” process of 
individual and collective education, of cultivating “resistance cultures” through the political 
practices and modes of being Villegas Moreno describes, which were needed to envision, desire, 
and build new futures, new worlds.  
The Flores Magón brothers would attend the First Liberal Congress with the intention of 
pushing the “priest-baiters” towards more militantly anti-Díaz positions and, ultimately, towards 
a more expansive confrontation with the reigning political and economic system. As Salvador 
Hernández Padilla notes, Ricardo and the young radicals argued that “la solución a los 
apremiantes problemas de la mayoría de los mexicanos no podía reducirse a cuestiones tales 
como la no-reelección sino que era necesario partir de un programa que contemplara un buen 
número de reformas socioeconómicas” (The solution to the urgent problems that the majority of 
Mexicans faced could not be reduced to such matters as non-re-election but rather that it was 
necessary to break from a political program that considered a large number of socioeconomic 
reforms) (22). Indeed, Ricardo’s young political star began to rise after he gave a rousing speech 
at the Congress, during which he unabashedly called out Díaz and his administration as “a pack 
of thieves” —a proclamation that was shocking enough (and unexpected by reform-minded 
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attendees) to be greeted with hisses at first, followed by tentative cheers and growing applause as 
Ricardo repeated it two more times.  
While resolutions from the First Liberal Congress stayed within the programmatic 
framework of anticlericalism and the preservation of civil liberties and bourgeois democracy, the 
wheels for something much bigger had been set in motion: a growing struggle to confront not 
only the political rot of the Porfirian regime but the prevailing social and economic order it 
enforced at the expense of the subjugation and exploitation of the working and peasant classes. 
From here on out, the very possibility of radicalizing enough sectors of the population to the 
point of revolution—along with the possibility of guiding the political and ideological motives of 
would-be revolutionaries—would depend, in large part, on the erection of vast political 
infrastructures that could provide the operational architecture for a political movement capable of 
withstanding political repression from Díaz and eventually overthrowing him. From clandestine 
communication and transportation networks to political education institutions and solidarity-
building cultural microclimates (“resistance cultures”), it was vital to establish and fortify such 
infrastructures through which people could organize and arm themselves with the social, 
ideological, informational, and material resources needed for a movement—any movement—to 
grow. Purveyors of the Liberal Club movement understood this, as Javier Torres Parés notes: 
 
Las resoluciones del Congreso Liberal, a pesar de situarse en un plano 
básicamente anticlerical, abrieron la posibilidad de una acción más amplia, en la 
medida en que se fijaba como objetivos promover el respeto de las leyes, la 
educación liberal y cívica de la nación, la lucha contra la corrupción 
administrativa así como la “abolición de toda tendencia personalista en los 
gobiernos, que pueda juzgarse preferente a la Constitución de 1857 y las Leyes 
de Reforma”. Para propagar los principios liberales, se propuso la organización 
de clubes a los que se asignó la tarea de realizar conferencias públicas sobre 
instrucción cívica, establecimiento de bibliotecas y, de ser posible, el 
establecimiento de escuelas primarias laicas para adultos y niños. Los clubes se 
plantearon organizar y fomentar “sociedades obreras en las que se instruya a los 
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asociados sobre sus derechos naturales y deberes civiles y políticos”, así como el 
fomento de “sociedades mutualistas para la defensa de las prerrogativas y 
derechos de sus miembros, y para desarrollar en el pueblo el espíritu de ahorro y 
de economía de fuerzas, a la vez que se trabajará por extirpar el alcoholismo del 
seno de esas agrupaciones y de la sociedad en general”. Los liberales le 
prestaron especial atención a la defensa de la libertad de expresión y la libertad 
de sufragio (20-21). 
 
The resolutions of the Liberal Congress, despite being situated within a largely 
anticlerical framework, opened up the possibility for broader action, insofar as the 
objectives were to promote respect for the laws, the liberal and civic education of 
the nation, the fight against administrative corruption as well as the "abolition of 
all personalist tendencies in governments, which could be deemed preferential to 
the Constitution of 1857 and the Reform Laws."  In order to spread liberal 
principles, it was proposed that clubs be organized, and that these clubs would 
hold public lectures on civic instruction, establishing libraries, and, if possible, 
establishing secular primary schools for adults and children. The clubs set out to 
organize and promote "workers' societies in which members would receive 
instruction on their natural rights and civil and political duties," as well as the 
promotion of "mutual societies for the defense of the prerogatives and rights of 
their members, and for developing in the people the spirit of saving and of an 
economy of forces, at the same time working to eradicate alcoholism from the 
bosom of these groups and from society in general.” Liberals paid special 
attention to defending the freedoms of expression and of suffrage (20-21). 
 
As we can see in this passage, the connective tissue between this early phase of prerevolutionary 
Liberal dissent and the politics of what would become magonismo was as much (if not more) 
material as it was ideational (or “ideological,” narrowly defined). As Torres Parés describes, and 
as the Flores Magón brothers recognized, the organization of Liberal Clubs was understood to be 
a vital process that would establish the anthropotechnical infrastructure needed to generate, 
strengthen, and air condition resistance cultures and “mutualist” social formations wherein 
workers, through active civic practice, could be and become the kind of political subjects they 
needed to be. However, where Liberals saw the capacity of such a political infrastructure to 
conform and condition Mexicans to become subjects who could better exercise their rights and 
fulfill their duties in a liberal democratic formation (and thus ensure the healthier functioning of 
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civil society within that political system), the magonistas, as I will argue in this chapter, would 
locate in this infrastructure—and the processes of building, maintaining, and growing it—the 
capacity for fomenting a true social revolution. Because the PLM would come to understand 
that, no matter how active civil society was, political liberation could not materialize by way of 
liberal democracies that didn’t push for economic liberation and, in fact, depended on the 
implicit socioeconomic hierarchies that prevented it. As noted in a front-page article in the July 
27, 1912 issue of Regeneración, under the heading (which spanned the whole page) of “LA 
REVOLUCION SOCIAL EN MEXICO,” 
 
Dado que mientras no exista el bienestar material en el pueblo, no gozará éste de 
independencia, afirmamos que la realización completa de los principios 
democráticos es imposible. En efecto, el que nada tiene está obligado á cumplir 
la voluntad y los caprichos del que le da el salario que necesita para su 
subsistencia y la de su familia, hasta el grado de verse forzado á abdicar de sus 
derechos de ciudadano votando en el sentido que se le ordene, En tal virtud la 
condición de los trabajadores, condenados por la organización social, á no 
recibir más que lo indispensable para que sus amos no pierdan la fuerza de 
trabajo que necesitan, no cambiará en lo mas mínimo con las modificaciones que 
pudiera sufrir el organismo gubernamental (Mendoza López, “Esclavitud”). 
 
Given the fact that as long as the people have no material wellbeing they will not 
enjoy their independence, we hold that the complete attainment of democratic 
principles is impossible. Indeed, he who has nothing is obliged to comply with the 
will and whims of the one who hands him the salary he needs for his subsistence 
and that of his family, to the extent that he is forced to abdicate his rights as a 
citizen by voting in the sense that is demanded of him. Consequently, the 
conditioning of the workers, condemned by society and social organization, to not 
receive more than what is necessary so that their masters do not lose the work 
force they need, will not change in the least with the modifications that the 
government body could suffer (Mendoza López, “Esclavitud”). 
 
For the PLM, the struggle for justice, liberty, and dignity demanded more than an institutional 
blood transfusion; it demanded a revolution in “la organización social,” a rewiring of social 
relations through less hierarchical and more mutualistic arrangements, the full liberatory 
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potential of which could only be realized insofar as they were able to evade being captured, 
channeled through, and mediated by the conductors of capital, Church, and state. Magonismo’s 
split with its Liberal roots manifested in the realization that the political and social infrastructures 
they themselves were helping to build could be more than a civil supplement to the institutions of 
liberal democracy; they could serve as the structural basis for a mutualistically organized society 
that could exist, they argued, without such institutions. And, as I argue, we can see how the 
project of magonismo itself—a revolutionary project aimed at bringing such a society into 
being—developed through, and was embodied in, the collective, infrastructural, resistance-
culture-building process of making, disseminating, and engaging with Regeneración.  
Of course, all of this would take place within the contexts of tectonic historical shifts, 
domestic and international, that had radically reshaped the country and its political economy over 
the course of the porfiriato (1876-1911), heightening socioeconomic contradictions in ways that 
would, in turn, amplify cultural, racial, and ideological divisions. Mexico’s Porfirian epoch of 
“modernization,” for instance, saw the tremendous development of capitalist production and the 
emergence of a new industrial workforce (and with it, a growing, if rudimentary, tradition of 
labor organizing that differed significantly from that of artisan struggles); the greater integration 
of the Mexican economy into the world market and further penetration of foreign investment and 
control of labor, natural resources, and capital flows. “By the outbreak of the revolution,” Shawn 
England notes, “private U.S. interests had secured more of Mexico’s trade than all the European 
nations combined. A key element of Mexico’s attraction to foreign investment was the Porfirian 
labor code: workers were forbidden to organize, and the nation’s security forces—armed with the 
latest weaponry from more developed nations—ensured that any unrest would be crushed” (246). 
(Having built much of Mexico’s great “modernization” by further transforming it into a “a 
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virtual economic satellite” of the U.S., the Díaz government and its powerful northern ally 
clearly had vested interests in squashing political factions like the PLM, whose political 
influence on working people threatened to destabilize this forcefully imposed economic 
arrangement.) Along with these changes, the porfiriato was characterized by the expansion of the 
hacienda system and greater concentration of land ownership for exploitative hacendados; “the 
disintegration of the old agrarian communities,” which “went hand in hand with the splitting of 
artisan layers into a few capitalist bosses at the top and a mass of wage laborers at the bottom” 
(Gilly, 28); and the development of railway, telegraph, and electrical systems, which provided 
unprecedented means of national integration as well as the permeation and consolidation of 
federal government power, allowing for information, officials, and troops to reach far and move 
quickly. However, much like the forces of capital and state repression harnessed this 
modernizing circuitry to serve their own ends and secure their interests, the forces of 
revolutionary foment flowed, too. 
The PLM and Regeneración—indeed, the entire movement we call magonismo—
participated in the history-shaping, bottom-up response to these equally brutal and awe-inspiring 
changes to Mexican society—a response culminating in revolution. This response entailed, and 
depended on, strategies to utilize the social, political, and communicative infrastructures of 
Mexico’s “modernization” and what came before; it also depended on enacting strategies for 
working with available resources—from mobile people and smugglers to community spaces, 
printing presses, and communal forms of organization—in order to erect new political networks 
in which their revolutionary movement could move, grow, learn, and live. This is a story about 
those strategies.   
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************************** 
 
With its official newspaper, Regeneración, the PLM emerged as an infinitely demanding 
voice of dissent against the reign of Porfirio Díaz and, ultimately, against the “three- headed 
hydra” of capital, clergy, and the state writ large. The youthful fearlessness of its leading 
members had a price, though. After facing repeated harassment by Díaz’s police forces, the 
forcible closing of Regeneración, and imprisonment from 1902-1903, Ricardo and his closest 
collaborators fled across the border to the U.S, where they continued printing invectives against 
government and Church corruption and the willing submission of Mexican lands and people to 
the whims of foreign capital. It was in the United States that Ricardo and Enrique would 
establish themselves as members of the organizing Junta of the newly formed PLM, along with 
Juan and Manuel Sarabia, Librado Rivera, Antonio I. Villareal, and Rosalio Bustamante. Ricardo 
would never return to Mexico until after his death in Leavenworth Penitentiary, Kansas, in 1922. 
During their political exile in the U.S., especially in the early years, the Junta was often 
on the move, setting up printing shops in Texas before moving to St. Louis, and then to Los 
Angeles. Their presence and, especially, their printing operations were followed closely by 
officials of the Díaz and U.S. governments alike as well as private investigators (“Pinkertons”) 
from the Furlong Detective Agency, who were hired by the former. In a report filed to Díaz 
outlining Ricardo as a “dangerous anarchist,” the Agency noted that “The Flores Magóns, 
Sarabia, and Villarreal have always appeared […] as men fanatical over one idea and for that 
reason they are dangerous, as are all persons that one encounters with that obsession […] they 
are always talking of tyranny […] of the rich classes, in particular the hacendados and 
industrialists, who exploit the workers” (qtd. in Hart, 89). Soon thereafter, David E. Thompson, 
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the United States Ambassador to Mexico, “informed the United States Department of State that 
the PLM ‘worried’ President Díaz, ‘harmed United States business interests,’ and advocated 
‘anarchism’” (Hart, 89).  At every step of the way, they were harassed and repeatedly imprisoned 
by the U.S. government under trumped-up pretenses that were the result of political pressure 
from Díaz’s collaboration with U.S. government officials who saw the PLM and their 
revolutionary fervor for ousting Díaz as a threat to American business and political interests in 
Mexico (MacLachlan). As Claudio Lomnitz describes, “Ricardo tried to direct the revolution 
from Los Angeles, but his activity there landed him in prison. He spent the years from 1907 to 
1910 in prisons in Los Angeles and Arizona, from 1912 to 1914 at McNeil Federal Penitentiary 
in Washington state, four months of 1916 again in the L.A. County Jail, 1918 and part of 1919 at 
McNeil again, and from 1919 until his death, in November 1922, at Leavenworth Federal 
Penitentiary in Kansas” (The Return, xxiii). Even after Díaz had been overthrown, the PLM had 
become embroiled in a climate of high anxiety over the toxic, “foreign” Other of anarchism in 
the U.S., especially in the lead-up to World War I. “The United States government initially 
viewed [Ricardo] as a Mexican problem,” Colin MacLachlan writes, “but in the end, it 
considered him a danger to internal security and responded accordingly” (115). As its political 
and ideological influence on the Mexican Revolution waned, the PLM’s continued persecution 
by the U.S. government inevitably had more to do with this domestic anxiety than the violation 
of international neutrality laws that the U.S. had with Mexico, though these neutrality laws––
along with the Comstock Law, which “empowered postal inspectors to prohibit ‘obscene’ 
material [which Regeneración was ultimately deemed to be] from passing through the mail” 
(Struthers, 55)––remained the most effective legal smokescreen to justify their persecution. 
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In a 1906 issue of Regeneración, published on July 1st while Ricardo and Juan Sarabia 
were hiding in Toronto, the Junta printed thousands of copies of their “Manifesto to the Nation” 
alongside their “Program of the Liberal Party.” Issues were mailed to subscribers across the U.S. 
and smuggled into Mexico through all sorts of creative means; as Ethel Duffy Turner wrote years 
later in Ricardo Flores Magón y el Partido Liberal Mexicano, such smuggling operations even 
came to include sending copies of Regeneración in hollowed-out Sears Roebuck catalogues 
(385). Concluding with the clarion call for “Reform, Liberty, Justice,” these documents landed 
like a bombshell in the carefully and brutally policed “public sphere” that Díaz and his 
administration had worked hard to purge of dissenting voices. Before this, the PLM’s forced 
retreat to the United States, as Adolfo Gilly notes, “[marked] the peak year of the Díaz era,”  
 
“social peace” officially reigned in the country. Strikes and labor unions were 
outlawed, “agitators” punished by conscription, deportation to the plantations, or 
imprisonment. Peasant revolts had been drowned in blood, and the “pacification” 
of rebellious tribes seemed complete. Not having to face any organized 
opposition, apart from the harassed, imprisoned, or exiled groups of Magonistas, 
the federal government and its army held sway in every region. The peasant and 
urban population did maintain a silent resistance throughout the country, but 
without seeming to challenge the official appearance of things (38).  
 
As the issuance and dissemination of the PLM’s program showed, however, the surface layer of 
relative political quietude belied teeming, clandestine networks of political activity, growing 
worker unrest, and an increasingly robust communicative infrastructure through which dissidents 
and information could flow and strategies for dissent could be hashed out. “In 1906,” John Hart 
writes, “in the midst of widespread labor strikes, Regeneración’s circulation increased to thirty 
thousand […] Despite full prisons, the Díaz regime failed to significantly compromise the 
security of the PLM clandestine infrastructure within Mexico” (90). Appealing to expressed 
principles of “national dignity” and “patriotism,” the PLM proposed many reforms that would 
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resonate with the drafters of the 1917 Constitution and the architects of the institutionalized 
revolution, including: mass, “secular” education reform; restrictions on the Catholic Church; an 
8-hour workday; a livable minimum wage (and the legal prohibition of bosses “paying for work 
in any other manner than in cash”); the abolition of de facto slavery under the Hacienda peonage 
system; mass redistribution of lands with special restitution for indigenous populations; 
restrictions on foreign speculation, etc. (“Programa del Partido Liberal”). 
For five years, the PLM operated under the aegis of this liberal reformist platform, even 
as the aspirations of its leading ideologues became more anarchistic and anti-statist in principle: 
“In 1908 the PLM committed itself firmly, but secretly, to anarchism […] For tactical reasons, 
however, Ricardo believed the PLM should not publicly announce its new political stance. 
Behind the liberal banner, he believed he could reach a large audience that otherwise might reject 
anarchism” (MacLachlan, 6-7). This commitment to outward ideological moderation wouldn’t 
last long. For many, with the eventual overthrow of Díaz in 1911 and the succession of Francisco 
I. Madero, this platform made the PLM’s differences with the maderistas more or less 
indistinguishable. Even among the original members of the Junta, only Ricardo, Enrique, and 
Librado Rivera truly committed to an anarchist worldview, resulting in splits within the PLM 
that would leave those who remained to focus more explicitly on an anarchist political project, 
forging more robust connections with American anarchists like Emma Goldman, William C. 
Owen, and Voltairine de Cleyre, and European anarchists like Florencio Bazora, Jaime Vidal, 
and Alfred Sanftleben. Many  PLM  members,  including  Ricardo’s  older  brother  Jesús,  
would eventually defect when Ricardo threw down the gauntlet against Madero, whom he 
declared a traitor to the revolution, “a millionaire who has seen his vast fortune grow through the 
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sweat and tears of the peons on his haciendas” (“Manifiesto a todos los trabajadores del 
mundo”).  
In response to criticisms from Mexico and from leftist factions in the U.S. and Europe, 
the PLM published in Regeneración two successive anarchist manifestos in 1911. In the 
“Manifesto to the Workers of the World,” published on April 3, 1911, the Junta wrote that the 
“formidable struggle of the two social classes in Mexico is the first act in the great universal 
cataclysm which very soon will break upon the scene all over the planet, and whose final act will 
be the triumph of the magnanimous formula of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity which the bourgeois 
political revolutions have not been able to translate into physical reality, because these 
revolutions have not dared to break to pieces the dorsal spine of tyranny: capitalism and 
authoritarianism” (Dreams of Freedom, 135). Then in the “Manifesto of the Organizing Junta of 
the Mexican Liberal Party,” published on September 23, 1911, the Junta directly addressed the 
fighting men and women in Mexico: “Abolishing this principle [of private property] means the 
annihilation of all political, economic, social, religious, and moral institutions that comprise the 
ambient within which free initiative and free association of human beings are smothered […] 
Without the principle of private property there would be no reason for government, which is 
necessary solely for the purpose of keeping the disinherited within bounds in their quarrels or in 
their rebellions against those who hold the social wealth” (Dreams of Freedom, 138). Without 
ever saying the word “anarquísmo,” the Junta asserted a program of direct action and a 
declaration for the abolition of the principle of private property, which would, as they saw it, 
eliminate the need for the State. The thundering refrain of “Reform, Liberty, Justice,” had now 
morphed into the anarcho-communist motto: “Land and Liberty!” This new motto, which would 
be adopted by the Zapatistas during the revolution, marked the PLM’s official rejection of state-
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reformism and, instead, argued for a total social revolution—an economic, cultural, and political 
overhaul of the organization of social life. “Since, in México, land was the basic form of wealth, 
it must be distributed equally and immediately,” as Juan Gomez-Quiñones notes; “that should be 
the first objective” (45). But the question of land contained a deeper significance in the PLM’s 
vision of social revolution. Based on an admittedly idealized notion of indigenous communality, 
the redistribution of land signified an effort to revivify a more mutualistic form of living that, in 
the PLM’s eyes, predated the perversion of private property and the institution of European 
models of statehood. As Shawn England writes,  
 
Magonismo drew its influence in part from agrarian indigenous Mexican cultural 
values, and for this reason it reflected these values and flourished in the rich 
cultural soil of agrarian indigenous Mexico. And “Land and liberty” (tierra y 
libertad) were the basic principles for which hundreds of thousands of Mexican 
people gave their lives during the revolution, and magonismo was the 
revolutionary philosophy that best articulated these goals. It was a unique 
synthesis of European anarchist thought (with a heavy emphasis on Kropotkin) 
and an idealized—or imagined—conceptualization of indigenous cultural patterns 
characteristic of agrarian Mexico (244) […] The continued existence of 
communal lands in Mexico, even after decades of erosion by Porfirian 
modernization schemes, appeared to vindicate the anarchist faith in the viability 
of mutualism and communalism (253).  
 
Taking at face value Magón’s idealization of non- or less hierarchical social arrangements of 
indigenous communality on shared land is problematic.5 At the very least, though, the fact that 
 
5 There is, embedded within idealized assessments of the nature of indigenous communality in 
Mexico, a version of what Roger Bartra has called “tropical kitsch”: “This longing for an original 
savage Eden has caused many to spill tears over what I call tropical kitsch. Milan Kundera 
wrote: ‘Kitsch causes two tears to flow in rapid succession. The first tear says: how nice to see 
children running on the grass! The second tear says: how nice to be moved, together with all 
mankind, by children running on the grass! It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.’ The 
specialist in mythical savages could paraphrase this: ‘How lovely to see Indians fighting in the 
tropical jungle! The second tear, which falls from the eyes of progressives in the United States 
and Europe, tends to be the best substance around for embalming artificial Indians and savages’” 
(“Tropical Kitsch,” 28).  
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the development of magonismo’s political ideology was inextricably tied to the “continued 
existence of communal lands in Mexico,” and to an aspirational conceptualization of social life 
made possible within such arrangements of communally held land, affirms the unique and 
uneven development of the magonista strain of anarchist politics, which was never a one-to-one 
effort to implement some fully formed ideological system imported from Europe, but a 
movement that became what it was in conversation with local contexts, social traditions germane 
to Mexico, European texts and ideas and the transnational political infrastructure that brought 
them to Mexico, and more.  
 
************************** 
 
Historians and critics have made much ado about the increased “radicalization” of the 
PLM’s revolutionary ideology. But such assessments, for all their variation, are frequently 
founded upon two basic premises: (1) that the increasingly radicalized project of magonismo was 
an objective political failure; and (2) that the critique of this radicalization should primarily take 
place at the level of political philosophy, which will then provide an interpretive frame to explain 
magonismo’s tactical failings. The latter is more of a de facto (less of an explicitly stated) 
premise that emerges in the many critiques of magonismo itself. The principal theoretical 
limitation of magonismo’s developed anarchism, Gomez-Quiñones writes, “is its marked 
primitive philosophical negation: revolution is what society is not. Accordingly, its principal 
tactical deficiency is its lack of, in fact its disdain for transitional methods” (8). The problem 
with magonismo’s anarchism, Franz Hinkelammert echoes, is its impossible plan (or, rather, its 
lack thereof) for transitioning from the dismal reality of present subjugation to a liberated future: 
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This future is one in which social relations exist without any institutionalization or 
authority, yet the anarchist has no sense of the mediating forces needed for the 
transition to said future; between the present and the futures lies an abyss without 
any institutional bridge. The absolute polarization between oppressors and 
oppressed is reproduced in this absolute polarization between present and future. 
The result is a total lack of any idea of how to make the future a reality. Anarchist 
thought has no concept of praxis (126).  
 
After declaring their more outwardly anarchist opposition to the maderista liberals, the PLM’s 
remaining core members aimed to deconstruct the authoritative and hierarchical will of the 
world, which was organized around the oppressive principle of private property. Yet this primary 
ontological opposition, according to critics like Hinkelammert and Gomez-Quiñones, lacked a 
vision of the mediating structures needed to get from Point A to Point B. Likewise, Adolfo 
Gilly’s strong Marxist analysis of the Mexican Revolution ultimately ends up at a resigned 
acknowledgment that failure was written into the absence of a revolutionary program for 
controlling the central mediating structure of the state: “the decisive factor, in the end, was not 
revolutionary land seizures, but control of the centralized state power” (73). As opposed to, say, 
Bolshevik communism’s utilization of the socialist state apparatus as an interim necessity, 
anarchism’s deathly opposition to institutionalization, combined with its fetish for the 
“immediacy” of direct action, blinded it to the institutional media without which there could be 
no hope of moving from here to there, from now to eventually. As Bruno Bosteels writes,  
 
In terms of temporal and historical character, only socialism is here seen as 
capable of in spirit a long-term agenda for the class struggle, whereas anarchism 
is said to be limited to punctual flares of insurrectionary violence; in terms of 
spatial or geographical distribution, socialism would have a national, if not also 
international, orientation, whereas the anarchic struggle remains local and site-
specific; finally, at the level of organizational forms of appearance, anarchism is 
accused of favoring spontaneous uprisings and attacks as part of its ideology of 
direct action, to which only a socialist class-consciousness, aimed at state power, 
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is said to lend the necessary organization of an enduring political movement 
(“Mexican Commune,” 6) 
 
In sum, anarchists hope for a wormhole to utopia, but what they need are bridges, mediating 
structures through which one world can transition into another.  
 Indeed, these were critiques that defined the PLM’s posture during the revolutionary 
period itself. In the International Socialist Review, the great American Socialist Eugene V. Debs 
wrote of the revolution occurring south of the border, “If the land can be taken from the rich in 
this insurrection, so can also the mills, factories, mines, railroads and the machinery of 
production, and the question is, what would the masses in their present ignorant and unorganized 
state do with them after having obtained them? It would simply add calamity to their calamities, 
granting that this impossible feat were capable of achievement” (qtd. in Castañeda, 126). Ricardo 
and the Junta disagreed. Regardless of how noble or “well meaning” they were, the state and 
industrialists could not be entrusted with the task of transitioning Mexico to a more just and 
egalitarian society. “Indeed,” Christopher Castañeda writes, “the anarchist sensibility called for 
disarming the current power structure, and in this context, Debs seemed to be aligning himself 
with those who believed the masses were incapable of living without organization and direction 
imposed upon them” (126).  
This “anarchist sensibility,” I argue, was neither unfounded nor purely idealistic; it was a 
sensibility grounded in the material, the tangible. As they saw it, those who participated in the 
project of magonismo had seen, and helped create, the “proof” that a social revolution was 
possible, that these alternative ways of living were sustainable. Because the fundament of 
magonismo’s political project was characterized by a deep devotion to the building and 
maintenance of mediating structures that would help actuate the dreamed-of utopia, but these 
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were the media through which the movement itself lived and circulated; the media of 
communication, congregation, and cooperation, of being and becoming; the media through 
which alternative social arrangements could coagulate into routinized ways of living. It was 
characterized, moreover, by the reshaping or outright destruction of existing mediating structures 
in order to turn back to a form of social life that had already existed, the PLM argued, and from 
which modern man had been alienated. “In Mexico,” Ricardo reminded his readers, “we have 
had and we still have hundreds of proofs that humanity does not need a ruler or a government 
except when economic inequality exists” (“Sin Jefes”). A more expansive, atmospheric 
understanding of media is essential for grasping just what the project of magonismo was and how 
it worked. It is vital for understanding how—especially through the collective process of making, 
disseminating, and engaging with the party organ, Regeneración—magonismo aimed to create 
media-worlds that not only enabled people to resist the hegemony of authority and private 
property, but that also embodied an alternative way of living. The anthropotechnical creation and 
embodiment of these “resistance cultures” was the very mediating force that others have seen 
lacking in magonismo’s political project. 
 
 
Puntos Rojos 
Práxedis Guerrero first met Ricardo Flores Magón in November of 1907, while the latter 
was languishing in the Los Angeles County jail. Over the course of their initial meetings, 
Guerrero made such an impression on Ricardo that he was made second secretary of the Junta 
and one of the chief editors of Revolución (Regeneración’s short-lived, 1907-08 replacement). 
Guerrero spent the last few years of his short life serving the cause of the PLM until he was 
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killed in 1910 in Janos, Chihuahua, leaving 
his post as revolutionary author and editor to 
join the fighting in Mexico that was just 
getting underway. Guerrero’s poetic and 
erudite writings were featured and reprinted 
in a number of radical newspapers, including 
issues of Revolución, Regeneración (once it 
began its “third life” in L.A. in 1910), and in 
the paper Punto Rojo (Red Dot), which 
Guerrero himself established in El Paso, 
Texas.  Guerrero selected El Paso as a 
strategic communicative point where existing 
networks of moving trains, bodies, postal 
routes, and telegraph lines could carry Punto 
Rojo north, south, east and west while 
keeping him plugged into the news from the 
other side of the border. As Ward Albro 
describes, “The first issues were small four-
page, ‘digest’ size papers printed on a small 
press in the home of William Lowe, an El 
Paso socialist” (54). 
Punto Rojo was a considerably small 
operation with limited resources and a short 
Figure 2.1. “Puntos Rojos” column by Práxedis 
Guerrero, from Regeneración, 17 September 
1910. 
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production life, but it was enough to draw the ire of the Mexican government. The Mexican 
consul in El Paso forwarded issues to the Foreign Relations office in Mexico City along with 
memos that the publication was being “sold profusely” and had every intention to “increase 
agitation” and, thus, must be pressured into submission. As Armando Bartra writes, “In the 
middle of April 1910, Punto Rojo was 
accused of ‘criminal libel’ and Práxedis 
was hounded by the Secret Service under 
the charge of ‘violating the neutrality 
laws’; the Díaz government, on its end, 
offered $10,000 for his capture” 
(“Prólogo,” 48). Feeling the pressure in 
El Paso, Guerrero left the paper in the 
hands of Lowe and a small retinue of 
comrades and fled. 
Virtually no copies of Punto Rojo 
exist today, but the ephemeral publication 
did have a significant effect on 
Regeneración back in Los Angeles. In the 
beginning of its fourth stage (“cuarta 
época”), Regeneración included a 
“Puntos Rojos” column authored by 
Guerrero, in which he compiled rapid-fire descriptions of struggles in Mexico, aphorisms, stories 
of valor, and other relevant pieces of news (Figure 2.1). Moreover, after Guerrero’s death and the 
Figure 2.2. Original format of Regeneración’s 
primera época. Front page, 23 October 1900. 
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defeat of armed Liberal forces in Chihuahua in 1911, the influence of his puntos rojos lingered 
with Regeneración recasting its entire front-page format. “From then on, the first page was 
regularly dedicated to reporting brief news of the revolution’s advance from all states of the 
Mexican Republic. The idea was to produce an image that Práxedis might have called puntos 
rojos—multiple flash points of revolution through the entire nation. Internal pages then 
supplemented the image of a massive, spontaneous revolt—which was, in fact, really 
occurring—and attempted to provide it all with ideological direction and coherence by way of 
thematic pieces” (Lomnitz, The Return, 344). The Junta in Los Angeles remediated the format of 
Guerrero’s column and antecedent publication, believing that its form effectuated an 
anthropotechnical strategy consistent with its own. Short bursts of information covering the front 
page of every issue reported on revolutionary action in locales across Mexico. This editorial 
approach was well suited to the formatting changes previously made to Regeneración in its 
second and third épocas, which converted the early form of the “Periódico Jurídico 
Independiente”—characterized by a more formal, juridical layout with 16 smaller-sized pages 
containing two large columns of text—into the “Periódico Independiente de Combate”—
composed of four large pages containing much more text (six columns per page) in smaller print 
(Figure 2.2). As Liliana Paola Avila Meléndez writes, “Es probable que el formato grande fuera 
más adecuado para el público al que se dirigían, en la época anterior era más entendido en 
cuestiones legales, ahora la denuncia era para los trabajadores en general y como no todos 
sabían leer, acostumbraban a reunirse en grupo para escuchar al que sí sabia” (The large 
format was likely more suitable for its target audience, in the previous era it was associated with 
legal matters, but now the report/complaint was meant for workers in general and since not all of 
them could read, they used to meet in groups to listen to the one who did know) (25). Within this 
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more populist format, then, the puntos rojos created an intentionally atmospheric effect, a kind of 
air conditioning that made local struggles collectively visible to one another, imbuing them with 
a mutually reflective, ideological consistency and resonance, amplifying readers’ sense of the 
movement’s (real and imagined) presence in the swarm effect all around them.  
It is possible to see how this format played into the PLM’s very conception of their own 
position as ideologues of the revolution (Figure 2.3). The Junta (Ricardo especially) was 
ruthlessly criticized at the time for staying in Los Angeles to print Regeneración instead of 
joining in the fighting across the border. But Ricardo’s faith in Regeneración’s role as a medium, 
not only for communicating revolutionary ideology, but enacting revolutionary movement, far 
outweighed everything else. In the PLM’s adoption of Práxedis Guerrero’s concept of puntos 
rojos, the editors of Regeneración attempted to create, in the very layout of the newspaper, a 
Figure 2.3. Front page from Regeneración, 25 March 1911. 
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cognitive map and a printed sense of belonging for rebels in Mexico and Chicanos along the 
border. Such a map was intended to rewire readers’ spatiotemporal consciousness while 
subverting the communicative restrictions on the media ecology under Porfirio Díaz, transmitting 
to (potential) rebels in disparate parts of Mexico and the U.S. an image of a swarm and a 
message that fighting factions were not alone. In the sections of this chapter, I am attempting to 
recreate such an image, punctuated by puntos rojos, the purpose of which is to re-spatialize the 
history of the PLM’s political development, which was by no means a straightforward result of 
key political subjects’ instrumental use of media objects for their own political ends, but, rather, 
an uneven collection of dispersed contexts, acts, and self-constituting negotiations with changing 
media ecologies.   
 
 
Resistance Cultures 
When an ‘entire society,’ i.e., almost everything around you, seemingly to the 
smallest detail, reflects assumptions contrary to your most deeply held 
convictions about what the world is and can be—namely, the assumption that 
hierarchy, domination, violence, and injustice are the natural, necessary, and 
permanent characters of existence—then merely to persevere in imagining and 
acting on the assumption of the possibility of another kind of world is in itself a 
monumental and continual effort of resistance – Jesse Cohn, Underground 
Passages (8). 
 
“Resistance culture” can mean many things. The term culture in this context, depending 
on how narrowly one defines it, can signify products and practices within the extra-normal 
realms of “art and learning” (R. Williams, Keywords, 91); that is, some special form of 
expression beyond the habitual processes of everyday life (art, literature, performance, etc.). Or, 
in the tradition of the Birmingham School, the emphasis can shift from the material expressions 
 69 
of “high culture” to the signifying or symbolic systems of popular culture and people’s complex 
efforts to make meaning within such systems (Hall, Representations). Without imposing a strict 
either-or binary, though, Raymond Williams’ definition of culture in the more flexible terms of 
“customary difference” is more enduring and analytically useful. Custom, as Francis Mulhern 
writes, “or anything understood as custom, takes precedence over other modes of social 
validation, and its currency is difference. Thus, culture is what differentiates a collectivity in the 
mode of self-validating direct inheritance—whose value, in return, is precisely that it binds the 
collectivity in difference” (39). Culture, in this sense, is that to which one “collectivity” is 
accustomed that others are not: “the idea of a fundamental social process which shapes specific 
and distinct ‘ways of life’ is the effective origin of the comparative social sense of ‘culture’ and 
its now necessary plural ‘cultures’” (R. Williams, Marxism & Literature, 17). 
Likewise, as with terms like “the left,” “leftist,” or “radical,” the modifying term 
resistance is not nearly as clear as it may initially seem. What criteria—for intent or effect—
qualify an action, practice, product, or “social process” as resistant (or disqualify it as a true form 
of resistance)? What is being resisted—and does that matter? Does resistance in the construction 
“resistance culture” imply a certain “minor” or “alternative” position in relation to a 
hegemonized status quo? Or, put another way, does resistance specify the “pure” form of a 
certain recalcitrant, oppositional relation to power as such, or does it depend on a substantive 
political and ideological division that qualifies certain actions by certain people as resistance and 
others, performed in perhaps the same manner but for different ends, as reactionary? This 
reflexively opens back onto the problem of defining the left by terms as nebulous and seemingly 
unclaimable as “resistance” in the first place. The left, it goes without saying, has never had dibs 
on resistance, in the sense that an oppositional pose and disobedient action are not sufficient as 
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self-defining characteristics of the left and only the left. Resistance, understood in such terms, is 
not a “customary difference” that sets the politically and ideologically left identity apart from 
others. 
But anarchism occupies a soft space where “resistance” and “culture” depend on each 
other in a uniquely symbiotic, mutually affirming way. Other political collectivities may have, 
within their systems of customary difference, social processes, practices, and productions 
embodying targeted efforts to resist; that is, aspects of their culture that are called upon 
specifically for the purpose of mounting a resistance to encroaching forces. For anarchism, 
though, resistance culture is not so much an aspect or branch of an existing system of customary 
difference; it is the system. As Jesse Cohn writes, “the anarchist conception of ‘resistance’ is 
[…] something different and broader, aimed not only at one particular oppressive regime but at 
all forms of domination and hierarchy, whether these are constituted through the formal 
institutions of violence and property or the infinity of informal power relations through which we 
form our sense of ourselves and our world” (7). There is no other anarchist culture than that of 
resistance. Resistance is, and must be, the primary way of understanding and practicing one’s 
“role” within a society that is fundamentally based on the principles of inequality and authority. 
Life as an anarchist is a constant practice of resistance. And anarchist resistance culture is 
not only a culture that resists, but a culture that, in its very creation and continuation, is itself a 
form of resistance. At the time of Ricardo Flores Magón and the PLM’s most fervent political 
efforts, their drift towards anarchism embodied a political movement that outright denied the 
legitimacy of the very defining features of the twentieth-century landscape: nation-states and  the 
bourgeois facade of liberal democratic governance; organized religion; the hierarchical 
organization of production and consumption; white supremacy, patriarchal customs, and even 
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gender norms (though Ricardo and others were certainly not always able or willing to escape 
their own residual prejudices) 6. In a 2012 missive in Regeneración, Ricardo writes, “I tell you 
the rich scream to high heaven when they hear the redemptive cry: ‘Death to Authority!’ They 
have good reason, because if authority disappears the privileges of capital will fall into the same 
grave, never to rise again. Authority is necessary to social inequality; it guarantees that the rich 
will live in idleness while it condemns the poor to hard labor and abject misery” (“¡Muera la 
Autoridad!”).  
To say that the PLM and other anarchists embodied a movement is not a euphemism. For 
denial of the legitimacy of hierarchy was not simply an argument made, an opinion voiced, but a 
resistance lived. Within the anarchist fusion chamber, where theory and practice collide, the 
creation of a resistance culture must be understood as a co-constitutive, anthropotechnical 
process of self-fashioning and (or through) world-making—an effort to engender a prosthetic 
environment in which one can finally be and become oneself—a micro-climate of customary 
difference without which the very thing itself, the anarchist life form, could not sustain itself. 
The defining characteristics of this climate of customary difference were as varied as the term 
“culture” itself, involving: the production of aesthetic and educational material while also 
promoting alternative reading and communication practices consummate with an anarcho-
communist view of the world; the enactment of communal styles of living and working; the 
forging of social networks (through Liberal Clubs, newspapers, workers’ collectives) in rural 
areas and cities connected primarily by the draw of political solidarity; the reliance on intimate 
 
6 See, for instance: Jason Oliver Chang, Chino: Anti-Chinese Racism in Mexico, 1880-1940; 
Benjamin Abbot, “‘That Monster Cannot Be a Woman:’ Queerness and Treason in the Partido 
Liberal Mexicano” 
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circles of friendship, loyalty, and devotion to the cause, which was also coupled with an often 
destructive fervor for calling out and ousting “traitors”; etc. 
In the imperial age of industrial capitalism, anarchists like Ricardo Flores Magón lived 
within overlaying spheres that demanded subjective complicity by dominating the most basic 
staples of survival. Food, water, shelter, clothing, medicine—all required multiple and 
intersecting forms of submission to hierarchical systems of work, government, class, gender, 
race, ethnicity, etc. To live was to be bound by the necessities of the surrounding world, to 
participate in systems whose principles were fundamentally in opposition to the anarchist life. 
But it was still a necessity. Similar to what some feminist theorists have traditionally referred to 
as “double duty” or the “second shift” (Donovan), anarchists like Ricardo exhausted themselves 
on multiple fronts, performing work that contradicted their most deeply held beliefs so as to 
sustain the work they were doing in the name of those beliefs. As Enrique Flores Magón noted, 
writing soon after his brother’s death, “I’ve had a constant pain in my heart for about a month 
now […] Disappointments, disillusions, miseries, great anxieties, and deep sorrows in my twin 
struggle for the cause and for the loaf of bread—excessive labors, for the master by day, for the 
slave by night” (qtd. in Lomnitz, The Return, xxxiv). 
The anarchist’s efforts “to simply continue to exist in [this] radically false world” depend 
on forms of cultural creation that air-condition his more immediate micro-climates in order to 
sustain a life lived in perpetual exile, like a space suit sustaining a body on Mars. For Ricardo 
Flores Magón and the organizing Junta of the PLM, however, this exile was more multifaceted. 
Claudio Lomnitz has explored in remarkable detail, for example, the PLM’s transition from a 
student group founded on the legal defense of liberalism in Mexico to a combative organization 
in physical exile in the U.S. promoting an anarchist worldview. This slide towards anarchism 
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exiled the PLM’s revolutionary vision not only from more popular Liberal fronts involved in the 
Mexican Revolution, but from the political mainstream of the Left in the United States as well. 
Moreover, as Ricardo himself noted, and as Chicano historians and activists later in the 20th 
century would cite frequently, to be a Mexican in the U.S. was its own form of ethnic, racial, and 
linguistic exile: “We are revolutionaries and our ideals are very advanced, but we are Mexicans. 
That is our flaw. Our skin is not white, and not everyone is able to understand that underneath a 
dark skin there are nerves, there is a heart, and there are brains” (Obras Completas, 499).  Not 
only as an anarchist attempting to create and embody a communally focused life operating 
beyond the bounds of authoritative hierarchies at a time of national revolution, but also as a 
Mexican living in the United States, Ricardo’s belief system and his daily subsistence relied on 
cultivating a resistance culture that could air condition and fortify his revolutionary efforts while 
protecting him and his comrades from being stamped out by the many institutional forces to 
which they appeared as dangerous outsiders. 
Of course, the growth and development of any political project, the will to rewire hearts 
and minds for the propagation of such projects, also requires varied and creative techno-
spherological forms of air conditioning. In each instance, there are always complex and specific 
atmospheric conditions that such projects must work within, work to change, and work to 
harness for their own aims. At the same time, though, the agents behind each project rely on, and 
help create, cultural immune systems that can sustain the effort. Human existence, as Sloterdijk 
writes, “never simply adjusts itself to fit into what, using a modern and overly smooth term, we 
call its ‘environment’: rather, this existence creates its own surrounding space through which and 
in which it appears. Every social form has its own world house, a bell jar of purpose, under 
which human beings first of all gather, understand themselves, defend themselves, grow and 
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dissolve boundaries” (Spheres, I, 57) (emphases added). These “world houses” constitute 
immune systems, interior spheres, within which actors can “advance their individuations” while 
reproducing and validating the generational processes of customary difference. 
There are always multi-directional interactions within and between spheres—individual, 
tribal, ethnic, imperial, etc. This is why, following Sloterdijk, my approach evaluates the cultural, 
political, and communicative activity of historical subjects as forms and levels of mediation 
between said spheres. Under such an approach, what we’re referring to here as resistance culture 
must be understood as the techno-spherological inheritance and creation of processes of 
customary difference that mediate between an individual and her so-called “environment.” But 
spherological media are also, as already mentioned, the media of personhood itself, the technicity 
of the human, which is always, from “the start,” a dual, technical being (a being-in-technics) 
working outwards. “The theory of spheres is a morphological tool that allows us to grasp the 
exodus of the human being, from the primitive symbiosis to world-historical action in empires 
and global systems, as an almost coherent history of extraversion. It reconstructs the 
phenomenon of advanced civilization as the novel of sphere transference from the intimate 
minimum […] to the imperial maximum” (Sloterdijk, Spheres, I, 67) (emphases added). The 
history of magonismo, as with any other political movement, is the history of an exodus, of an 
extraversion that, through complex and repeated processes of mediation, attempted to 
(successfully or unsuccessfully) move outward from the most intimate spheres of its operatives 
to restructure ever larger, more encompassing ones. 
In some cases, as with the EZLN in Chiapas, the immunological function of resistance 
cultures may take precedence, developing and protectively insulating radical collectivities from 
encroaching mediatic forces while they are, at the same time, participating in and trying to shape 
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larger spheres—often out of necessity rather than choice. In other instances, as with the 
Communist Party’s emphasis on cultural propaganda, the function of resistance cultures may be 
more imperial, concentrated, actively directed towards societal air conditioning and restructuring 
broader social, political, cultural, “ethnotechnic” spheres. Again, though, this is not an either-or 
matter; it is more a question of degree for processes that mediate between multiple spheres, in 
multiple directions. However, what sets anarchism and the PLM apart from these other political 
projects is the fact that all these spherological factors are knotted together in a single “history of 
extraversion,” a history of mediation that is, itself, the political project of magonismo. The 
creation of the PLM’s anarchist resistance culture was, on one end, an effort to build an 
immediate sphere in which lives lived in perpetual exile could sustain themselves and their 
worldview. To quote Jesse Cohn again, 
 
[the] main body of the cultural production to emerge from the anarchist 
movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries […] can best be understood 
as a response to [the] question [‘how to live?’]—not quite a ‘solution’ or an 
‘answer’ so much as a way of living with the problem for as long as it lasts, a 
means of inhabiting history until it stops hurting. Anarchists practice culture as a 
means of mental and moral survival in a world from which they are 
fundamentally alienated” (14). 
 
What Cohn emphasizes here is that the necessity driving anarchist cultural production at the time 
of the PLM was an immunological—that is, biopolitical—one.7 Resistance cultures formed 
 
7 I approach the concept of “biopolitics,” the forms of medial-immunological resistance to it, and 
its application to the political reality of modern Mexico in the vein Gareth Williams describes in 
The Mexican Exception. Building on the concept’s articulation in the work of Michel Foucault 
and Giorgio Agamben, Williams writes, “Biopolitics is therefore the name for new mechanisms 
and calculations of power that emerged with the transition from the classical territorial—or 
police—state to the modern time of capital. If the police state is grounded in the unity of political 
and economic domination, biopolitics is the diffusion of technoscientific knowledge throughout 
the social sphere. In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault defines biopolitics as the treatment 
of the population ‘as a set of coexisting living beings with particular biological and pathological 
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protective spheres of social recognition and existential validation that made it easier for 
anarchists to “live with the problem” of the hierarchical and oppressive social order that 
dominated the world around them. This has also been the object of critique from historians like 
Gomez-Quiñones who see this immediate, immunological relationship to resistance culture as 
part of anarchism’s attitude and style of “uncompromising individualism and permanent 
opposition to the way things are […] anarchists affirm in their principles, and often in their 
individual lives, a central humanist aspect of revolution—free men and women devoted to 
making art out of life” (8). The assumption for both Cohn and Quiñones, though, is that such 
cultural production was more about managing symptoms on an individual level while planning to 
treat the root causes (finding a “solution”) in other areas, saving “answers” for another day.  
However, Quiñones does at least come closer to acknowledging that, while perhaps a 
necessity on the daily level of the individual, the ways of living that embody the anarchist’s 
resistance culture—the ways of “making art out of life”—do have a greater significance for the 
movement itself. The PLM’s production and embodiment of a resistance culture was not only an 
immunological effort to protect its members from the always-encroaching forces of normalized 
hierarchical domination; it was a political effort to erect from within a world dominated by those 
forces spheres of resistance in which alternative social relations could develop, grow, and move 
outward. The two efforts were one in the same: one implicated the other, and vice versa. These 
 
features, and which as such falls under specific forms of knowledge and technique’ (2007, 367). 
Biopolitics therefore refers to forms of power that perhaps do the state’s work for it but that are 
not necessarily the result of decisions taken at the heart of the state apparatus […] Biopolitics is 
the distribution and diffusion throughout society of the liberal laissez faire political, social, 
institutional, and economic regularization that administrates the acquiescence and consent of 
collectivities, the functional distribution of social powers, the systematized allocation of places 
and roles and the institutional procedures for legitimizing those distributions from beyond the 
specific political decisions taken by the state apparatus” (7, 11). 
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created spheres of resistance—spheres made manifest in, and buttressed by, the medial cocoons 
one built around oneself—were chambers of human conditioning within which people could 
become different kinds of political subjects, thinkers, community members, etc. The magonist 
project of social revolution, then, was as much a matter of militantly dismantling the institutional 
architectures of capital, clergy, and state as it was a matter of expanding and fortifying spheres of 
resistance, bringing more people in, conditioning oneself and others to become who they needed 
to be to take on the world—and to build and maintain a mutualistic society that could replace it. 
For magonismo, the personal was political insofar as the mediated chambers their resistance 
culture created were where personhood was meant to be crafted into something capable of 
destroying the hierarchical, exploitative, and de-humanizing system built around the golden 
principle of private property. As mentioned in the previous chapter, to study the 
anthropotechnical dynamics of such chambers is to see the dialectics of self- and world-making 
flow through the media and medial relations that connect one to the other; to study these spheres 
of human conditioning is to study the human condition, which is to say, the medial condition. As 
John Durham Peters writes,  
 
the human condition is recursive; it is a conditional condition: our actions change 
the conditions they act in, especially since they change us; we speak and act, and 
as we do we change the conditions in which we speak and act […] The crossroads 
of humans and things defines the domain of media studies. We are conditioned by 
conditions we condition. We, the created creators, shape tools that shape us. We 
live by our crafts and conditions. It is hard to look them in the face. In the 
grandest view, media studies is a general meditation on conditions […] It seeks 
nothing less than to sketch what Heidegger called a “poetic outline of [our] being, 
drawn from its extreme possibilities and limits” (51) 
 
Essentially, we are distinguishing here between two conceptualizations of human beings as 
political actors: on the one side, a presumption of self-contained beings who live and work 
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autonomously within the boundaries set by (and sedimented in) the material and immaterial 
conditions of the external world; in this conceptualization, to act politically is to act upon the 
institutional bulwarks upholding those boundaries, expanding (or contracting) the terrain and 
scope of permissible living. On the other side, self and world are fundamentally entangled in the 
process of the other’s becoming, enmeshed in overlapping networks of mediated connection (the 
“crossroads of humans and things [that] defines the domain of media studies”). In this 
conceptualization, to act politically is to engage in “a technical praxis of [intervening in] the 
enlivened circuitry mediating human and world as they make, un-make, and re-make each other” 
(Alvarez, 92); it is to act upon and shape the world as a means of acting upon and shaping 
oneself, and vice versa (conditioning the conditions that condition us, to paraphrase Durham 
Peters).  
The sphero-technical creation and embodiment of resistance cultures was thus an 
indispensable formalization of the anarchist political project of living differently and collectively 
creating spaces to do so (providing the model for what Hakim Bey would later call “temporary 
autonomous zones”). These resistance cultures mediated between individual political actors and 
their oppressive environment while also providing the potential pathways to restructuring the 
basic coding and operations of that environment from the most intimate levels up to the most 
expansive, like a virus changing the DNA sequencing of a host. While experienced differently 
and serving various functions on personal and communal levels, the individual facets of a 
resistance culture are nevertheless “produced specifically and consciously as the expression of an 
organized resistance movement” (Cohn, 7). Printed organs like Regeneración were essential to 
that project, as the sphero-technical media of the PLM’s resistance culture. In its pages, 
Regeneración advocated for the adoption of such a resistance culture, but in its very production, 
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circulation, consumption, and promotion of new social and subjective relations (traditionally 
termed “media effects”), Regeneración expressed and embodied the very culture, the anarchist 
project, it advocated. “Magonismo did not use Regeneración,” Armando Bartra writes: 
“Regeneración was Magonismo” (“Prólogo,” 15). The medium, in the immortal words of 
Marshall McLuhan, was the message. 
 
 
Spores and Networks 
But Regeneración, of course, was not alone: it was a central node in a much larger 
network of publications, people, relations of solidarity, political organizations, communication 
channels, and more. Studying the under- and above-ground facets of such networks, as David 
Turcato has argued, is vital to grasping the dynamic, robust, and truly international infrastructure 
of anarchism as a political and intellectual movement. To quote Turcato at length:  
 
As E.P. Thompson has argued for Luddism, there was an intentional side to the 
opacity of anarchist organization, for this was the very precondition of effective 
action. The counterpart of the opacity of organization was the spontaneous 
semblance of popular agitations. One cannot assume that behind any seemingly 
spontaneous ‘mob’ there lay anarchist organization. But where such work did take 
place, the image of a spontaneous mob was an indicator of its effectiveness. That 
an agitation appeared to be carried out by a mob speaks to the popular 
participation to it; and that the agitation seemed spontaneous speaks to the ability 
of anarchists to work underground. Neglecting anarchist opacity and limiting 
one’s scope of analysis to what rises to the surface, attempting to simply connect 
public events, is likely to provide distorted interpretations […] Thus, the historian 
cannot simply look for congresses, party programs, and party structures, but rather 
has to look also at the dense network of links between individuals and groups to 
study how anarchism functioned as a collective movement. In the sustained and 
multi-directional personal links between individuals and groups one can find the 
coordination and continuity that is usually looked for in the impersonal structure 
and fixed roles of formal organizations (247-248) 
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This is not to say that the “surface” manifestation of “pubic events”—from the first Liberal 
Congress held in San Luis Potosí to the political manifestos published in Regeneración—is any 
less important for the study of magonismo’s development. Rather, it is to acknowledge the need 
to study these as the concretized expressions of vast, complex, and less visible networks of 
communication, cooperation, transportation, and influence in which anarchism, as an 
international movement, lived.  
The Cananea strike of 1906 is one critical example in PLM history that highlights the 
dynamic Turcato describes between the deep and opaque organizational networks undergirding 
significant events that erupted onto the surface of public view. In the state of Sonora, the 
majority of Mexican workers at the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, which was co-
owned at the time by the U.S.-based Anaconda Copper Company and the beleaguered 
businessman “Colonel” William D. Greene, went on strike on June 1. What appeared at first to 
be a protest action by workers demanding the removal of particularly infamous foremen spiraled 
into days of rioting and a deadly armed conflict between Mexican mine workers and a posse of 
nearly 300 American volunteers and Arizona Rangers sent across the border by Greene. It was 
only when a contingent of rurales dispatched by Rafael Izabal, then Governor of Sonora, and 
Mexican federal troops arrived that the bloody strike ended. Along with making demands for 
better pay and an eight-hour workday, the workers forcefully called for justicia and igualdad, 
giving voice to long-simmering resentments over systematic racial discrimination in the mines 
and the company town. For too long, as Philip Mellinger writes, “Mexican and Spanish 
immigrants, Spanish Americans, and Italian immigrants were being treated as the ethnic inferiors 
of English-speaking workers, and they resented it” (64). While non-American and non-English-
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speaking workers dealt with everyday acts of discrimination and verbal harassment, these 
formalized racial hierarchies also kept them from earning compensation equal to their 
counterparts or holding senior positions, among other injustices. According to Leopoldo 
Rodríguez Calderón, a teacher at the 
Escuela Municipal de Cananea at the time, 
the miners “solicitaron de Mr. Greene, 
presidente de la Compañía Principal del 
Mineral, que se les redujera a ocho horas 
el tiempo diario de trabajo, que se les 
pagara cinco pesos como se les paga a los 
mineros americanos y se cambiaran 
algunos de los capataces americanos, que 
por su odio al pueblo mexicano, trataban 
de una manera muy dura a los pobres 
trabajadores que dependían de su mando” 
(made the request of Mr. Greene, 
President of the Compañía Principal del Mineral, that their workdays be reduced to eight hours a 
day, that they be paid five pesos like the American miners, and that the company replace some of 
the American foremen who, in their hate for the people of Mexico, treated the poor workers who 
depended on their leadership too harshly) (qtd. in Hernández Padilla, 39). The disparity between 
the stations and treatment of Mexican mine workers and Anglo extranjeros was stark. Esteban 
Baca Calderón, one of the labor leaders of the Mexican mine workers and co-founder of la Unión 
Figure 2.4. “La situación del mexicano no puede 
ser más humillante…” from Regeneración, 1 
May 1906. 
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Liberal Humanidad, which shared many explicit affinities with the PLM, described the brutal 
contrast:  
 
El número de barreteros y adentadores mexicanos era insignificante comparado 
con el de extranjeros. El cargo de capataz y mayordomo estaba reservado a los 
extranjeros, por excepción recaía este empleo en un mexicano; y en cuanto a los 
empleos superiores en talleres, oficinas, etcétera, diremos que todos los jefes eran 
extranjeros y todos percibían magníficos sueldos. Jamás vi un solo mexicano 
desempeñar funciones intelectuales como ingeniero, contador, etcétera […] Los 
extranjeros ocupaban residencias decorosas, alcanzaban un alto nivel de vida y 
disponían de fuertes sumas de dinero, que enviaban al país vecino, en tanto que el 
aspecto de la población mexicana y su condición económica ofrecía un contraste 
lastimoso (qtd. in Hernández Padilla, 31). 
 
The number of Mexican barreteros y adentadores was insignificant in 
comparison to those from abroad. Overseer and foreman positions were reserved 
for foreigners, and only in exceptional circumstances would such posts fall to a 
Mexican; as for the higher positions in workshops, offices, etc., we shall say that 
all the bosses were foreigners and all received excellent salaries. I have never seen 
a single Mexican take on intellectual roles such as engineer, accountant, etc. […] 
Foreigners lived in dignified residences, attained a high standard of living and had 
large sums of money, which they sent to their neighboring country, while the 
appearance of the Mexican population and their economic conditions were pitiful 
in contrast (qtd. in Hernández Padilla, 31). 
 
The convergence of these heavily racialized forces of exploitation, discrimination, humiliation, 
foreign capital (and the militant protection thereof by governmental and extra-governmental 
entities), etc. brought to a head many of the social contradictions that the PLM was attempting to 
wage war against—and that the Junta described and agitated over in the pages of Regeneración 
(Figure 2.4). While tapping into a base sense of desigualdad on the job that Cananea mine 
workers could feel on the most visceral and material levels, the transparent injustice of the 
racialized hierarchy that devalued their labor and belittled their humanity on a daily basis laid 
bare the violent, inefficient, and arbitrary nature of such formalized social and economic 
systems. From there, as the PLM knew (and, indeed, as any good political organizer and agitator 
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will know), what needed to follow was a communicable assurance that such systems were also, 
in fact, replaceable. As one flyer that was circulated during the strike (the producer of which is 
unknown) stated: “Mexican people: rise up! Learn what has been forgotten. Organize yourselves 
and determine your rights. Demand the respect you deserve. Each of us Mexicans are despised 
by the foreigners, but we can be equal to them if we unite and demand our rights” (qtd. in Akers 
Chacón, Radicals in the Barrio).  
While it would be inaccurate to claim that the Cananea strike was the expressed result of 
a direct, coordinated PLM strategy—in the vein of, say, their short-lived military seizure of 
Mexicali in 1911—the PLM and Regeneración nevertheless had built up a significant and 
influential presence among the workers in Cananea, providing much of the human conditioning 
(agitation, education, organization, community building, etc.) that would prove necessary for the 
uprising. Underneath the floorboards where this historical event took place, behind the violent 
worker struggle that captured national attention, signaled the illusory nature of the porfiriato’s 
seeming labor peace, and sparked a string of subsequent strikes, a subterranean hive had been 
teeming with transnational organizational and agitational activity in which the PLM played a 
pivotal role.  
Again, the growing Liberal Club network established critical and strategic nodes of this 
transnational network in places like Cananea, fortifying the political infrastructure through which 
the tools, people, and relations needed to build a revolutionary movement could connect, 
circulate, resonate, and grow. “The Club Liberal ‘Libertad,’” as Rodolfo Acuña writes, 
“circulated propaganda throughout Arizona and Sonora in 1905. Clubs also operated in 
Hermosillo, Cananea, Nogales, and Sahuaripa. In the spring of 1905, the Douglas club sent 
Antonio P. Araujo, Enrique Bermúdez, and José López to Cananea. Plácido Ríos made frequent 
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trips to Douglas to buy arms and spread propaganda. […] By May 1906 Enrique was in Cananea, 
publishing the radical newspaper El Centenario, which reprinted material from Regeneración” 
(127). In fact, while they were attempting to find a footing and build trust with the mine workers, 
one of the first things that the PLM organizers dispatched to Cananea did when they got there 
was disseminate copies of Regeneración and encourage workers to communicate with one 
another about them (and to read articles to illiterate coworkers). As Hernández Padilla writes,  
 
Eran ‘los agentes de la revolución’ que la corriente magonista anhelaba, pero 
que aún no tenía una idea muy clara de cómo desarrollarla junto con los obreros 
y campesinos de México. Los primeros pasos en esa dirección los estaban dando 
aquellos tres activistas al dar a conocer Regeneración entre los obreros mineros 
de Cananea, discutir con ellos algunos de los artículos contenidos en el periódico 
y hablarles no de grandes teorías sino de sus propios y agobiantes problemas 
cotidianos. Muy pronto, esa efectiva forma de comunicación fue plenamente 
compartida por un buen número de trabajadores en Cananea (30). 
 
They were ‘the agents of the revolution’ that the Magonista current had longed 
for, but they didn’t yet have a very clear idea of how to advance the revolution 
alongside the workers and peasants of Mexico. Those three activists were taking 
their first steps in that direction by disseminating Regeneración among the mining 
workers of Cananea, discussing some of the newspaper articles with them, and 
speaking about their own overwhelming daily problems instead of grand theories. 
Soon afterward, this effective form of communication was taken up by a large 
number of workers in Cananea (30). 
 
Things progressed relatively quickly from there. In the spring of 1906, Lazaro Gutíerrez de Lara 
established the Club Liberal de Cananea and served as club president, communicating and 
collaborating with the Unión Liberal Humanidad, which was founded in January the same year 
and run by would-be strike leaders Esteban Baca Calderón, Francisco Ibarra, and Manuel 
Diéguez. As previously mentioned, the expansion of the Liberal Club network was vital for 
building out the political infrastructure for organizing anticlerical and anti-Díaz dissent and 
engaging citizens in practices of civic education, community building, etc. And the networked 
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skelature connecting different Clubs across Mexico and parts of the U.S. functionally established 
lines of communication and cooperation between them. Like Regeneración’s incorporation of 
Práxedis Guerrero’s puntos rojos into its editorial format to visually create a swarm-like picture 
of revolutionary activity around Mexico, the multiplication and interconnectedness of Liberal 
Clubs generated a similar sense of a robust, sophisticated, and widespread operation—an 
operation whose continued functioning signaled the health of a growing movement that 
sympathizers in their own locales could be confident in, knowing that it required coordinated, 
dedicated action across regions by many seen and unseen actors connected by a common cause. 
That is to say, the Liberal Club network itself was, in its own way, a mediatic functionary of a 
resistance culture that was not limited to that of the PLM; in its political operations, it 
communicated, embodied, and further generated a culture of dissent that drew people in, 
conditioned them, and was conditioned by them. Such a communicable culture, and the 
confidence it engendered in the broader political operation of the movement, was also, by 
necessity, baked into the organizational structure of individual Clubs. As John Hart writes,  
 
By 1906 the PLM had forty-four clandestine guerilla units and Liberal clubs 
operating within the five zones into which they had divided Mexico. The northern 
sector, zone three, aided by intense activity on the American side of the border, 
was the best organized and comprised the states of Sinaloa, Baja California, 
Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. A camarada de 
confianza who carried the title of delegado commanded in each zone. A national 
commander-in-chief who reported to the Junta in the United States directed the 
five zone delegados. Beneath the zone delegado was the guerilla unit commander 
(jefe de guerilla) and his assistant, the subjefe, the only two members of the local 
units who knew the identity of the zone delegado. Urban and rural working-class 
volunteers primarily comprised the guerilla units, which varied in size, some as 
large as two hundred to three hundred members, but averaged somewhat under 
fifty. The volunteers elected the jefe and sub-jefe from among their own numbers. 
In that manner the PLM built a popular mass following, gave the members a sense 
of full participation, and maintained organizational security (90) 
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As much as it was needed to secure the day-to-day safety and functioning of the Clubs, this 
formalized organizational structure was integral to the mediatic process of human conditioning. 
Even today, successful political and labor organizers understand that getting people involved and 
engaged in such participatory practices is important for the purposes of spreading work around 
manageably and accomplishing tasks. More than this, though, the performative qualities of such 
participation mediate a kind of political subjectivity and belonging that those same people 
embody in the act; it activates them, draws them into the collective process of building power, 
and changes them in the process. As American union organizer Jane McAlevey notes, this 
approach to organizing “places the agency for success with a continually expanding base of 
ordinary people, a mass of people never previously involved, who don’t consider themselves 
activists at all—that’s the point of organizing […] Individual campaigns matter in themselves, 
but they are primarily a mechanism for bringing new people into the change process and keeping 
them involved” (10). It was this model of organization that the PLM hoped—but did not have 
enough time or capacity—to establish in the Club Liberal de Cananea before workers went on 
strike. In late May, shortly before the strike erupted, a PLM delegation that included Gutiérrez de 
Lara, Juan Sarabia, and Librado Rivera met in secret with worker leaders from the mines, urging 
them to build up their organizational capacities before walking off the job. Their entreaty was not 
heeded, and the strike began soon after. Nevertheless, that the workers were agitated and 
organized enough to strike in the first place is a testament to the clandestine activity taking place 
in the shadows of the daily grind of the mineworks—and to the robust, transnational political 
infrastructure that connected and helped to facilitate these activities.  
Beyond circulating and encouraging discussion about Regeneración, PLM members also 
supported worker struggles and utilized their contacts with workers across the border regions of 
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the U.S and Mexico, helping to shuttle them to other strategic sites and to create in them 
mediatic nodes of their growing resistance culture. “Aparte de utilizar sus excelentes contactos 
con grupos chicanos establecidos a lo largo de ciudades y pueblos fronterizos del sur de los 
Estados Unidos,” Hernández Padilla notes,  
 
el trabajo inicial de Araujo, Bermúdez y López en aquellos campos mineros era 
continuamente reforzado por otros activistas, quienes con su militancia 
ampliaban el área de influencia del PLM en los centros mineros de Nuevo México 
y Arizona. Hacia allá se trasladaba, en determinadas épocas de cada año, un 
buen número de trabajadores mexicanos que después de trabajar una corta 
temporada en “el vecino país del norte” regresaba a México labraba la tierra 
durante otra temporada y mientras llegaba el tiempo de “levantar la cosecha”, se 
empleaba en las minas cananenses. Surgía así—como justamente lo ha señalado 
un historiador—“un nuevo tipo de trabajador semindustrial, semiagrícola”, 
mismo que en la mayoría de los casos brindaba una ayuda invaluable a la 
organización magonista pues durante su estancia en “el otro lado” entraba en 
contacto con las ideas socialistas y anarquistas de los militantes de la Western 
Federation of Miners y al cruzar de nueva cuenta la “frontera nómada” 
propagaba dichas ideas entre sus compañeros de “acá de este lado” (33). 
 
the initial work of Araujo, Bermúdez and López in those mining fields was 
continually bolstered by other activists, who, in their militancy, expanded the 
PLM's sphere of influence in the mining centers of New Mexico and Arizona. At 
certain times of the year, a good number of Mexican workers would move to 
those centers, work for a short season in "the neighboring country to the north," 
then return to Mexico to cultivate the land for another season; while they awaited 
the time “to reap the harvest,” they were employed in the Cananea mines. Thus 
there arose—as one historian has just pointed out— “a new type of semi-
industrial, semi-agricultural worker,” who, in most cases, provided invaluable 
support to the magonista organization, since during the worker’s stay on “the 
other side,” he came into contact with the socialist and anarchist ideas of the 
militants of the Western Federation of Miners and, by crossing the “nomadic 
border” again, he spread these ideas among his comrades from “here on this side” 
(33). 
 
As with the expansion of railway networks, the increased industrialization of Mexican economic 
production, etc., the structural changes to Mexico’s political economy that characterized 
Porfirian “modernization” also created conditions for the movement of people, ideas, and 
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resources that radical groups like the PLM would attempt to harness for their own political 
purposes. The emergence of this “new type” of “nomadic,” “part-industrial, part-agricultural 
worker” moving across the U.S.-Mexico border and back is a case in point. While working in the 
U.S., such workers came into contact with PLM organizers and ideas in Regeneración circulating 
in the Southwest as well as more militant anarchist and socialist strains of the Western 
Federation of Miners (WFM). As Justin Akers Chacón notes,   
 
Radical and magonista papers were distributed on both sides of the border, but 
began to reach a wider audience among Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the 
US. Through a network of militants and PLM-affiliated clubs, the paper spread 
from Los Angeles to Texas, with subscriptions also scattered throughout the 
Midwest […] The paper was used as a means to educate, organize, and make 
occasional calls to action, through regional transmission belts that included 
railroad workers, miners, small farmers, farmworkers, and sympathetic 
intellectuals. Through this expanding base of proletarian media, radical journalists 
began to not just focus on Mexican events, but to pay closer attention to the 
realities facing Mexicans in the US and the mechanics of US capitalism (Radicals 
in the Barrio).  
 
Coming into contact with this “expanding base of proletarian media,” engaging with other 
workers through them, discussing their content—these were significant experiences that 
punctuated the workaday toil and that also helped workers rationalize the very changes to society 
and economic production that shaped their lives in the early 20th century while providing social 
and conceptual avenues to think and (re-)act politically. They carried such experiences with them 
back to Mexico and, in turn, mediated them through the social relations they built with other 
workers in industrial and agricultural settings and even on the boxcars they rode across the 
otherwise lonesome desert landscape. These social bonds, through which experiences, ideas, and 
“influence” became communicable—not just verbally articulable, but communicable in the sense 
of a “communicable disease” (Guillory, 331)—were among the critical, lively media that 
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connected working people to a resistance culture that worked on and through them. “In the 
sustained and multi-directional personal links between individuals and groups,” to recall David 
Turcato, “one can find the coordination and continuity that is usually looked for in the 
impersonal structure and fixed roles of formal organizations” (248). Cananea didn’t just happen. 
From these interpersonal links to the expansion of Liberal Clubs and the circulation of copies of 
Regeneración therein, much of the groundwork for the agitation and organization that 
culminated in the Cananea strike was done through—and through the construction of—a 
transnational political infrastructure of dissent, a complex mediatic network that the PLM 
harnessed to support, guide, and condition the Mexican mine workers with the hope of steering 
their uprising towards more revolutionary ends. “The discourse of the revolution knew no 
boundaries,” as Emma Pérez notes. “Language, words, corridos, and concepts crossed back and 
forth along the Mexico-U.S. border as easily as the renowned revolutionary Francisco ‘Pancho’ 
Villa” (56). 
 
************************** 
 
Like an air-conditioning system connecting disparate spaces (spheres) throughout a large 
building, humming with activity behind the walls, these networks teemed with the flow of news, 
knowledge, personal communications, political connections, books, guns, money, etc. In certain 
exceptional cases, perhaps, we can determine the direct impacts of the transmission of any one 
object, idea, etc. through such networks on people and political groups; more frequently, though, 
the contingencies of their circulation, along with the presumptuous baggage that comes with 
measuring “influence,” create an after-the-fact illusion of a smooth sequence of influence. For 
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example, when it comes to measuring the influence of socialism and anarchism on the Mexican 
revolution, as Bruno Bosteels notes,  
 
On one hand, such interpretations tend to judge the situation from the point of 
view of the (lack of) direct knowledge or influence of ideas reaching the country 
from abroad—whether from Soviet Russia or from Western Europe. This holds 
for socialism and for communism, which are then frequently equated with their 
definitions in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Trotsky; as well as 
for anarchism, which is then typically studied in terms of the influence of ideas 
from Proudhon, Bakunin, or Kropotkin. In both cases, influence is supposed to be 
one-directional, from center to periphery, and tied to easily identifiable texts and 
traditions. On the other hand, the ideological and political traditions in question, 
ready to be imported from abroad, often tend to be described as becoming 
confused or overly eclectic in Mexico, but only because their corresponding 
sources are usually presumed to have reached a principled maturity in Europe 
(“Mexican Commune,” 4-5) 
 
The process of influence is (and was) much messier. Engaging with radical works and traditions 
from Europe was undeniably a critical factor in the political and ideological development of the 
purveyors of magonismo. As Arnaldo Córdova writes, “Es verdad que Flores Magón conocía ya 
desde los primeros años del siglo diversos escritos anarquistas y comunistas europeos […] 
conoció obras de Kropotkin, Bakunin, Malatesta y Marx […] como muchos otros, se interesó en 
la llamada ‘novela social’ (Gorki y Zola) y en el socialismo ético a la manera de Lammenais y 
Tolstoi” (It is true that Flores Magón, from the initial years of the century, was familiar with 
various European anarchist and communist writings […] he knew works by Kropotkin, Bakunin, 
Malatesta and Marx […] like many others, he became interested in the so-called 'social novel' 
(Gorki and Zola) and in ethical socialism in the manner of Lammenais and Tolstoy) (177). By 
their own personal testimonies, engaging with these and other works was a formative experience 
for the founding members of the PLM, one that shaped their own respective processes of 
intellectual and political development. And while these works left many visible traces of their 
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influence in the articles published in Regeneración, not to mention in the personal 
correspondence of PLM members, attempting to intellectually and temporally map out causal 
connections between one and the other can be treacherous for a number of reasons, including the 
fact that it would impose a schematically flat rendering of individual selves, ideas, and how they 
converse with each other by way of eschewing “an ontological understanding of the human as a 
fundamentally open-ended thing whose being is always, necessarily, a being-in-process, 
mediated by changing worlds in and through which it can become what it will be” (Alvarez, 88). 
Rather than concepts- and beings-in-process shaping each other in uneven and unpredictable 
ways as they inhabit different spheres, each is presumed to be a self-contained entity producing 
or inhabiting the other. Perhaps it is less important, then, to find conjectural, one-to-one 
correlations of influence than to acknowledge the significance of the very presence of these texts 
in Mexico at the turn of the century, as well as the role they played as lively sites for intellectual 
engagement and debate, community building, and connecting with a transnational infrastructure 
that gave weight to the perceived transcendence and universality of the radical vision for the 
world Ricardo and others were developing. It was, after all, this very transnational infrastructure 
that helped to bring the many radical works of theory and literature that PLM members read, 
discussed, and thought with to Mexico in the first place. 
 As previously mentioned, Camilo Arriaga, the wealthy Liberal from San Luis Potosí, 
played a pivotal role in sparking the collective processes that materialized in the first Liberal 
Congress in 1901 and the Liberal Club movement. Arriaga was also a friend and an intellectual 
and financial benefactor to many young Liberal dissidents like Juan Sarabia, Antonio Díaz Soto 
y Gama, Rosalío Bustamante, Ricardo Flores Magón, “and a score of others who lent numerical 
weight and vocal support to his crusade for Liberalism […] This new generation of young 
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idealists met with Arriaga regularly in his home behind the Arriagas’ Hotel Jardín, ‘to read and 
comment upon works by the most advanced revolutionary authors of the time’” (Cockcroft, 67). 
Scenes like these were commonplace for this retinue of young radicals who, in most cases, 
would go on to become revolutionaries. Along with a shared political fervor, one of the central 
magnetic forces that drew them together was Arriaga’s renowned library, which was stocked 
with works of radical literature and theory, including seminal texts of anarchist thought from 
authors like Proudhon, Bakunin, Malatesta, Tolstoy, and more. “La presencia de Arriaga en 
México” (The presence of Arriaga in Mexico), Florencio Barrera Fuentes writes, 
  
no sólo determinó una mayor cohesión en el grupo liberal de la capital, sino que 
significó por otra parte, tal vez más importante, la iniciación en la cultura 
revolucionaria de los militantes del liberalismo. La generosidad de Arriaga, 
consecuente con su fortuna personal, le permitió hacer llegar a manos de sus 
correligionarios obras como La Conquista del Pan y la Filosofía Anarquista de 
Kropotkin, El Catecismo Revolucionario y Los Principios de la Revolución de 
Bakunin, El Manifiesto Comunista y El Capital de Marx y lo mejor que sobre 
temas sociales se editaba entonces (116).  
 
not only established greater cohesion amongst the liberals in the capital, but also 
meant, perhaps more importantly, the induction of the militants of liberalism into 
revolutionary culture. Arriaga's generosity, consistent with his personal fortune, 
allowed him to deliver into the hands of his fellow believers works such as 
Kropotkin's The Conquest of Bread, Bakunin’s The Revolutionary Catechism, 
Marx’s The Communist Manifesto and Capital, and other important works on 
social themes that were published at that time (116).  
 
Arriaga deployed a not-insignificant chunk of his family wealth to assemble this extensive 
library, voraciously ordering titles whenever and wherever he could find them; he also personally 
bought and arranged for the transport of a large collection of titles during a trip to France in 
1900. As John Cockcroft notes, “The ‘Librairie Stock’ was a prominent publishing house and 
library in Paris which, through its ‘Bibliothèque anarchiste,’ distributed the works of Europe’s 
leading Anarchists, and through its ‘Bibliothèque cosmopolite’ assembled the works of 
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noteworthy authors (Tolstoi, Ibsen, Hugo, Kipling and others). It was there that Arriaga obtained 
much of his collection of revolutionary works” (70). By way of complex, transnational systems 
of travel, translation, printing, commerce, and transportation, these works made their way to San 
Luis Potosí. There, in their own way, they became nodes of those systems, not only connecting 
the Mexican dissidents to a deep anarchist intellectual tradition but expanding that tradition to 
further include (and be shaped by) Mexico. Recalling Bosteels, the processes of transporting, 
disseminating, and thinking with these works was never a question of wholesale, unidirectional 
transmission of knowledge from the White European center to the periphery. To pick up any title 
off of Arriaga’s shelves was not to download—and attempt to implement—a fully formed 
ideological system (is any literary encounter ever that simple?); it was to engage in one’s own 
sphere, tangibly and conceptually, with transnational efforts to reorient the foundations of 
political possibility, to participate in broadening the collective scope of political imagination. In 
their very presence, circulation, and mediatic functions, these books, as Florencio Barrera 
Fuentes notes, helped to give radical ideas the vibrant social content of a radical movement: “La 
propagación de libros revolucionarios hecha por Arriaga, al parecer intrascendente, determinó, 
sin embargo, que a partir de este tiempo se diera al movimiento liberal más amplio contenido 
social y que se iniciaran en el anarquismo todos sus prosélitos, porque anarquistas lo fueron 
entonces todos, y que de ahí partiera la limpia trayectoria anarquista de Ricardo Flores Magón” 
(While seemingly unimportant, the dissemination of revolutionary books undertaken by Arriaga 
established that, from this moment on, the liberal movement would be given the broadest social 
content and that all its proselytes were initiated into anarchism, because from then on they were 
all anarchists; and from that point one could trace Ricardo Flores Magón’s sharp anarchist 
trajectory) (116). 
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That is to say, inasmuch as the text within each book served as an always-imperfect, 
never-totalizing medium for conveying thought and history and experience, the book itself 
functioned as an always-imperfect, never-totalizing medium connecting disparate continents, 
people, points in time, and more. As media, books become temporary middle grounds: sites of 
convergence and connection, conductors channeling energy flows back, forth, and beyond. And 
their mediatic functions overlap and intertwine. Because, at the same time that they served as 
middle-points of connection between the young Mexican radicals and the infrastructure of a 
transnational anarchist tradition, these books also served as points of engagement between the 
members of their growing community, points of cohesion and camaraderie as they gathered 
together to discuss (a mediatic function that Regeneración would try to replicate), conductors of 
common cause, shared experience, even friendship. As Patricia Romyna Báez Rentería writes,  
 
Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama afirmó que antes de 1901 ya se encontraban leyendo 
literatura anarquista en San Luis Potosí. Santiago R. de la Vega, por su parte, 
rememoró aquello en un discurso que dio en 1932, donde expresó las siguientes 
palabras: “[Arriaga] ponía en nuestras manos a Carlos Marx. Por el conocí yo 
al dulce príncipe Kropotkin […] gracias a Camilo—Camilito, como lo 
llamábamos—toda la biblioteca Stock de París formó parte de nuestros equipajes 
en las prisiones” (99). 
 
Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama confirmed that even before 1901 people were reading 
anarchist literature in San Luis Potosí. Santiago R. de la Vega, for his part, 
recalled as much in a speech he gave in 1932, where he expressed the following 
words: “[Arriaga] put Carlos Marx in our hands. Through him I met the sweet 
Prince Kropotkin […] thanks to Camilo—Camilito, as we called him—we carried 
the entire Stock library in Paris into prison with us (99).  
 
Even as his friends and comrades languished in prison, Arriaga sent them books to read and 
think with and pass the time. Bringing the books was more than an attempt to encourage the 
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together, a mediatic gesture connecting them inside and 
outside the prison walls, reminding the prisoners that they 
weren’t alone—that the movement lived, and they were part of 
it. Even more locally—but no less expansively—Arriaga’s 
books were mediatic sites of self-articulation: a means for 
each young radical to continue their own political becoming; 
platforms through which who one was could reach who they’d 
become; pathways in time connecting individuals like Ricardo 
to the many past, present, and future iterations of their being. 
(Without acknowledging the self- and world-making dynamics 
of these delicate mediations, to discuss the intellectual and 
political “radicalization” of Ricardo Flores Magón—or anyone 
else—is to impose conceptual limitations on the full human 
experience of becoming through the media-worlds he helped 
make, and that helped make him.)  
Arriaga’s library, of course, was not the only example 
of the convergence of such numerous and intersecting 
mediatic functions, but it was a salient one for Ricardo and the 
founding members of the PLM, who would attempt to create 
in Regeneración itself a similar, lively site of transnational 
connection, political education, community building, and self-
articulation. One development that was particularly 
reminiscent of Arriaga’s expansive collection, which had 
Figure 2.5. “Biblioteca 
Sociológica de 
Regeneración” from 
Regeneración, 21 October 
1911. 
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brought the Mexican radicals together a decade prior in San Luis Potosí, was the Biblioteca 
Sociológica de Regeneración, the founding of which was announced in the pages of 
Regeneración in the October 21, 1911 issue, in a column that listed a litany of titles in unbroken 
succession, divided only by their price (Figure 2.5). As the column advertised, the curated titles 
that comprised the Biblioteca Sociológica de Regeneración were marketed at special prices for 
subscribers to the newspaper, providing a means for expanding readers’ engagement with topics 
related to anarchism, syndicalism, class struggle, religion, and more. Based in Los Angeles, the 
Biblioteca Sociológica was an idea that grew out of conversations between Ricardo and the well-
known Spanish-language bookseller Rómulo Carmona, who owned the “La Aurora” bookshops 
in Los Angeles and Oxnard. Although, the selection of titles included—87 books and pamphlets 
in total—suggests that Ricardo also consulted with William C. Owen, who was then editing 
Regeneración’s English backpage: “por un lado Henry George y Max Stirner y, por el otro, 
Clarence C. Darrow, el abogado liberal norteamericano defensor de los miembros de la 
Industrial Workers of the World y promotor de una reforma penitenciaria, tema que interesaba 
particularmente a Owen” (on the one hand Henry George and Max Stirner and, on the other, 
Clarence C. Darrow, the liberal American defense lawyer who represented members of the 
Industrial Workers of the World and who promoted prison reform, a subject that particularly 
interested Owen) (Barrera Bassols, 12). The tradition of “bibliotecas sociológicas” was 
prominent in hispanoamerican anarchist publications and publishing houses such as the 
Biblioteca Sociológica in Buenos Aires, which published works by the Italian anarchist Pietro 
Gori as early as 1898, and the famous Biblioteca Sociológica Internacional in Barcelona. It is 
signifcant that the announcement of the Biblioteca Sociológica was published one month after 
the PLM’s September “Manifesto of the Organizing Junta of the Mexican Liberal Party,” which, 
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in a sharp divergence from the maderista Liberals, declared magonismo’s open embrace of 
anarchist politics. As Jacinto Barrera Bassols writes,  
 
El contenido de la Biblioteca Sociológica es un reflejo de ese momento: ya que 
además de ofrecerse escritos de los clásicos ácratas: Bakunin, Kropotkin, 
Prohudon, Nordau, Malato, Grave y Reclus, entre otros; incluía algunos títulos 
de la “Escuela Moderna”, mismos que, tras la ejecución de Francisco Ferrer y 
Guardia, habían incrementado su demanda. Un lugar especial guardan en ella 
los textos sobre asuntos religiosos, todos ellos desde una perspectiva anticlerical; 
los panfletos a favor del control de la natalidad y un par de textos sobre el 
sindicalismo revolucionario. La novela estaba representada por Emilio Zola y los 
reportajes políticos por Volney, la poesía libertaria por Miguel Rey y el teatro 
por Louis Massot y el evolucionismo por Denoy, y, por supuesto, Darwin (11).  
 
The contents of the Biblioteca Sociológica are a reflection of that moment: in 
addition to offering writings from classical anarchists—Bakunin, Kropotkin, 
Prohudon, Nordau, Malato, Grave and Reclus, among others—it also included 
several titles from the “Modern School,” those that, after the execution of 
Francisco Ferrer y Guardia, were increasingly in demand. Reserved within the 
library was a special place for texts on religious matters, all of them written from 
an anticlerical perspective, pamphlets in favor of birth control, and a couple of 
texts on revolutionary unionism. The novel was represented by Emile Zola and 
political reports by Volney, libertarian poetry by Miguel Rey and theater by Louis 
Massot and evolutionism by Denoy, and, of course, Darwin (11). 
 
The creation of the Biblioteca Sociológica de Regeneración and the titles offered therein reflect 
one of many modes through which anarchist resistance cultures developed as a means of human 
conditioning. Along with Regeneración itself, the Biblioteca Sociológica aimed to create 
microclimates of resistance that would help readers navigate and bear their daily experiences of 
unjust social and economic hierarchies in their own spheres; they helped comprise the medial 
chambers in which readers could become the kind of political subjects they needed to be—not 
only by developing their own political consciousness, expanding their political imagination, etc., 
but by doing so in ways that connected them, conceptually and practically, to a sense of 
intellectual community and a communal sense of political purpose. Along with Regeneración 
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itself, readers were encouraged to engage with the books on offer in the Biblioteca Sociológica, 
discuss them with others, write to the PLM to share their thoughts, etc.; they were encouraged, 
that is, to explore the medial relations these books offered, relations that aimed to formalize the 
social revolution by formally mimicking the same mutualism professed within many of the 
books themselves. As with the ‘Librairie Stock’ titles Arriaga brought to Mexico, the titles 
included in the Biblioteca Sociológica were as much a source of political and ideological 
education that could supplement the radical propositions made in the PLM’s Manifesto as they 
were mediatic nodes of a networked political tradition that traversed centuries, aimed to 
transcend national borders, and that connected those who entered Rómulo Carmona’s bookshop 
to a transnational political infrastructure that gave anarchism’s ostensibly universalist principles 
the meat and weight of a political movement.  
 This world-shaping sense of transnational connection was not limited to one newspaper 
or bookshop. Nodes of this expansive mediatic network were more immediately visible and 
tangible in the spheres of everyday experience for many of the same people that the PLM hoped 
to reach. Newspapers for sale in an array of different languages, material from said newspapers 
regularly translated and reprinted on one another’s pages, articles referring to news, people, and 
places around the world—for working people among many different ethnic groups in pockets 
around the U.S. (mainly in the Southwest and along the border) and in Mexico, these provided 
daily reminders of their connection to, if not a transnational “community,” then at least to a 
world in which people, personhood, and political struggle were not defined by national borders. 
Even with Regeneración, the physical newspaper was always a lively site of medial connection 
to a movement and a political infrastructure that was often visible in the party members hawking 
copies on the street, in the discussions engendered by the content on its pages, in its printed 
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presence in other publications and vice versa. In many ways, as I’ve argued, the erection and 
maintenance of this political infrastructure embodied the political and mutualistic substance of 
magonismo; insofar as it transported through its circuits messages of a growing political struggle 
for social revolution, it also constituted the medial architecture for the type of resistance culture 
in which such a social revolution could take root and grow. At its height, Regeneración’s 
subscriptions reached over twenty thousand (Struthers, 53), but while not accounting for the 
reach of reprinted articles in other publications and copies that were passed around or read to 
others out loud, these numbers also belie the opaque network (to use David Turcato’s 
terminology) of frenzied political action that made this distribution possible. “A main function of 
being a magonista was distribution of the party organ,” Akers Chacón writes,  
 
Members sold the paper on street corners throughout the Mexican communities of 
Los Angeles, the outlying districts, and throughout barrios and colonias in the 
Southwest. The papers were read in individual homes, in discussion groups in 
club meetings, and whatever sympathetic groups of Mexican workers gathered. 
Regeneración and other aligned papers were also circulated on both sides of the 
border, creating a mass-readership of PLM-affiliated press from the southwest to 
Mexico City. They also reprinted other’s articles, cross-fertilizing radical 
discourse. (Radicals in the Barrio) 
 
Even the seemingly dull bureaucratic nuances of this distribution network contained within them 
hints of a concerted political strategy, one that relied heavily on volunteer action by members 
and sympathizers whose success necessitated building social relations that actuated the political 
ethos conveyed in the pages of Regeneración. For instance, as David Struthers notes, “Publishers 
of anarchist publications offered bundle orders for purchase to allow supporters to carry through 
the communities, selling the paper and spreading the word” (53). This was the case for 
Regeneración, with single-order annual subscriptions in the U.S. costing two dollars in 1910, 
individual copies costing five cents, bundle orders of 100 copies costing three dollars, $12.50 for 
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500 copies, $20 for 1,000. In the commercial world, such a pricing model for buying in bulk and 
reselling is called wholesale; in the anarchist world, it’s called organizing.  
 Beyond individual distribution, Regeneración, along with other anarchist publications, 
was also part of a vast media ecology in which political causes and ideas flowed through 
different communities and languages. David Struthers, for instance, describes some facets of the 
complex, multi-lingual and intercommunal distribution network that connected Regeneración to 
a wide range of other radical publications, political groups, and public institutions:  
 
In addition to individual subscribers and bundle orders, the editorial staffs of other 
newspapers received copies of Regeneración, which further extended the paper’s 
reach. This was most often part of formal news exchanges between papers that 
worked to expand the coverage of all the papers involved. The socialist California 
Social Democrat, IWW-affiliated El Rebelde, in addition to the Daily Tribune 
Reporter and Pacific Press, received copies of Regeneración in this fashion. The 
Russian-language Velikij Okean and Chung Sai Yat Po, a Chinese-language paper 
in San Francisco, also participated in the exchange. Moreover, the Pacific News 
Agency in San Diego, American Economist, the Seattle Herald, and the Seattle 
Star subscribed. The Los Angeles Public Library and Columbia University’s 
library in New York both received weekly issues of Regeneración (55-56) 
 
For anarchist outfits like the PLM, the organizational significance of these mediatic connections 
becomes even more apparent when compared to the production and circulation of party organs 
that were attached to more bureaucratically robust and hierarchically organized institutions, like 
with the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) and their publication, El machete, which I will 
examine in the following chapter. In the absence of more rigidly formalized transnational 
political infrastructures connecting Communist Party operations to one another, and connecting 
all back to the Comintern, these sorts of exchange networks between publications, institutions, 
political groups, etc. became critical components of the load-bearing support system that kept 
Regeneración, the PLM, and magonismo afloat.   
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 This support system also extended to the fungal network of independent and affiliated 
publications that, like spores, spread, expanded, and enriched the movement. As Clara Lomas 
writes, “The principal propaganda organs of the PLM in Los Angeles were Revolución 
(Revolution) in 1907 and Libertad y Trabajo (Freedom and Work) and Regeneración 
(Regeneration) from 1910 through 1918” (53). Outside of L.A., though, a considerable number 
of political actors and groups in locales dotted around the country, like puntos rojos, primarily in 
the southern states, took it upon themselves to “spread the word” by contributing to 
Regeneración and creating and disseminating their own publications. None of these respective 
operations has received the historical and analytical attention that Regeneración has—nor, to be 
fair, did they attain the political significance of Regeneración—but those that were directed by 
women have, until recently, been particularly understudied. One critical exception is Emma 
Pérez’s The Decolonial Imaginary: Writing Chicanas into History (1999). “Many women wrote 
for the Partido’s newspaper, Regeneración, on both sides of the border, but mostly in Los 
Angeles,” Pérez notes,  
 
Women such as Sara Estela Ramírez in Laredo, Texas, the Villarreal sisters in 
San Antonio, and Blanca Moncaleano, Teresa Arteaga, and Maria Talavera in Los 
Angeles all contributed to the revolution’s agenda as revolutionists, activists, and 
journalists. The revolution, then, created a kind of renaissance during which 
women wrote essays and edited their own magazines, newspapers, and journals. 
Many of these women, who sought political exile in the southwestern United 
States, wrote prolifically, criticizing the dictator Porfirio Díaz and championing 
the revolution as a revolution for women (56).  
 
By writing articles for and providing intel to Regeneración, these women made vital 
contributions to fortifying and expanding the mediatic network in which the magonist project of 
social revolution lived. By producing political writing for other publications and creating their 
